Order independent equilibria
Order independent equilibria
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阶独立平衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eyal Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Moldovanu;Eyal Winter
我们研究了一个非合作博弈的联盟形成，基于联盟形式的基本博弈。我们引入了序独立均衡（OIE）。一个策略剖面是OIE，如果在序贯博弈中，对于任何先行者的规格，它仍然是一个均衡，并导致相同的回报。我们的结果是：（1）在OIE中，使用纯静态策略的收益必须在联盟形式的潜在博弈的核心。(2)如果基础博弈具有所有子博弈都有非空核心的性质，那么对于每个支付向量，存在具有相同支付的OIE。经济文献分类号：C70、C71、C72、C78。
We study a noncooperative game of coalition formation, based on an underlying game in coalitional form. We introduce order independent equilibria (OIE). A strategy profile is an OIE if, for any specification of first movers in the sequential game, it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff. Our results are: (1) Payoffs in OIE that use pure, stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form. (2) If the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then, for each payoff vector, there exists an OIE with the same payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C78.