Combining the endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the contents of strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly
Combining the endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the contents of strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly
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混合管理双头垄断中激励参数设定时机的内生选择与战略合同内容的结合
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2018.08.020
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jin-Li Hu;Satoshi Honma;and Hsiao-Ping Hsieh;本間聡;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Kiyoshi Matsubara;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本研究考虑的是一个激励参数设定时机和战略契约内容均为内生决定的博弈。我们研究了一个由福利最大化所有者和利润最大化所有者组成的管理型混合双寡头企业的博弈。我们假设两家公司的经理是根据他们的销售授权合同雇用的，这等于他们的利润和销售收入的加权和相对于他们的FJSV激励参数。我们证明了两种均衡市场结构是可能的：（1）市场结构中，上市公司的所有者是追随者与数量合同和私人企业的所有者是领导者与价格合同和（2）市场结构中，双方的所有者使用价格合同，并同时设置他们的FJSV激励参数在后期。此外，我们表明，最高程度的社会福利可以实现与第一个均衡的市场结构。因此，在本研究中考虑的游戏不同于游戏中，设置激励参数的时机和战略合同的内容都是内生决定的管理私人双寡头组成的两个企业的利润最大化的所有者。具体而言，在本研究所考虑的博弈中，政府等相应的权力机构没有必要根据每个企业的个体激励，对激励参数的设定时机和战略契约的内容进行自由决定。此外，由于成本函数和它们的数量表示下的两家公司的技术，我们确认的结果有关的均衡市场结构和福利的影响的情况下，两家公司都有恒定的边际成本函数关于它们的数量。
This study considers a game in which both the timing of setting the incentive parameters and the contents of the strategic contracts are determined endogenously. We investigate this game in a managerial mixed duopoly comprising a public firm with a welfare-maximizing owner and a private firm with a profit-maximizing owner. We suppose that the managers of both firms are employed based on their sales delegation contracts, which are equal to the weighted sum of their profits and sales revenues with respect to their FJSV incentive parameters. We show that two equilibrium market structures are possible in this game: (1) the market structure in which the owner of the public firm is the follower with a quantity contract and the owner of the private firm is the leader with a price contract and (2) the market structure in which the owners of both firms use price contracts and set their FJSV incentive parameters simultaneously in the late period. Furthermore, we show that the highest degree of social welfare can be achieved with the first equilibrium market structure. Therefore, the game considered in this study differs from the game in which both the timing of setting the incentive parameters and the contents of the strategic contracts are determined endogenously in a managerial private duopoly composed of two firms with profit-maximizing owners. Specifically, in the game considered in this study, it is unnecessary for the corresponding authority, such as the government, to regulate the free determination of both the timing of setting the incentive parameters and the contents of the strategic contracts based on each firm's individual incentive. In addition, since the cost functions and their quantities are represented under the technologies of both firms, we confirm the results concerning the equilibrium market structures and welfare implications obtained in the case where both firms have constant marginal cost functions with respect to their quantities.