Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste
Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste
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判断依赖、认知模态和个人品味谓词
DOI：
10.1007/s10988-008-9023-4
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
T. Stephenson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Stephenson
个人品味的谓语（有趣，美味）和认知情态（可能，必须）在确定表达的是谁的品味或知识方面有类似的分析困难。因此，他们在态度报告和某种分歧上有平行的行为。另一方面，它们的不同之处在于它们可以在多大程度上自由地与上下文突出的个体联系起来，在这方面，认知情态受到更多限制。我建议使用Lasersohn的（语言学与哲学28:643-686,2005）“判断”参数对这两个类进行解释，同时主张对Lasersohn的观点进行关键修改，以便允许扩展到认知情态，并解决他的解释所面临的经验问题。
Predicates of personal taste (fun, tasty) and epistemic modals (might, must) share a similar analytical difficulty in determining whose taste or knowledge is being expressed. Accordingly, they have parallel behavior in attitude reports and in a certain kind of disagreement. On the other hand, they differ in how freely they can be linked to a contextually salient individual, with epistemic modals being much more restricted in this respect. I propose an account of both classes using Lasersohn’s (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686, 2005) “judge” parameter, at the same time arguing for crucial changes to Lasersohn’s view in order to allow the extension to epistemic modals and address empirical problems faced by his account.