Optimal partial privatization in an endogenous timing game: a mixed oligopoly approach
Optimal partial privatization in an endogenous timing game: a mixed oligopoly approach
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-022-00777-9
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发表时间：
2022-02
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
A. Kawasaki;Takao Ohkawa;M. Okamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Kawasaki;Takao Ohkawa;M. Okamura
本研究考察了部分私有化程度和数量竞争时机的内生决定因素，这些内生决定因素是在同一产品双寡头垄断的情况下，由一家公共公司和一家国内或外国私人公司组成。我们开发了一个三阶段的游戏。在第一阶段，国内政府决定其部分私有化水平。在第二阶段，每个企业决定其数量设定的时间。在第三阶段，每个企业根据这个时间设定自己的产出水平。为了选择一个单一的均衡，我们使用了风险-优势准则。主要结论如下。当私营企业是国内企业时，部分私有化和私人领导在均衡中出现，而当私营企业是外国企业时，完全国有化和公共领导在均衡中出现。
This study examines endogenous determinations of both the degree of partial privatization and the timing of quantity competition under a homogeneous product duopoly with a public and either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We develop a three-stage game. In the first stage, a domestic government determines its partial privatization level. In the second stage, each firm decides the timing of its quantity setting. In the third stage, each firm sets its output level based on this timing. To select a single equilibrium for the timing game, we use the risk-dominance criterion. The main conclusion is as follows. When the private firm is domestic, partial privatization and private leadership emerge in equilibrium, whereas when the private firm is foreign, full nationalization and public leadership emerge in equilibrium.