Common Property Resource and Private Capital Accumulation
Common Property Resource and Private Capital Accumulation
复制标题
公共财产资源和私人资本积累
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-4615-1047-5_12
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
S. Katayama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Long;S. Katayama
本文提出了一个微分博弈模型的共同财产资源的开发，当代理人也可以投资于私人和生产性资本。它表明，在一般情况下，有一个阶段的资本积累，其次是一个阶段的储蓄不足。消费在下降之前也会达到一个峰值。当消费达到峰值时，净储蓄为负。每个参与人的价值函数在两个状态变量中是可分离的，当代理人是异质的时，生产能力越高的代理人积累的资本越多，但所有代理人遵循相同的消费规则和提取规则。
This paper presents a differential game model of exploitation of a common property resource, when agents can also invest in private and productive capital. It is shown that in general there is a phase of capital accumulation followed by a phase of dissaving. Consumption also attains a peak before falling. When consumption reaches its peak, net saving is negative. The value function for each player is shown to be separable in the two state variables.When agents are heterogeneous, the more productive agents will accumulate more capital, but all agents follow the same consumption rule and extraction rule.