Let’s Just Agree to Disagree: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Coalition Agreements
Let’s Just Agree to Disagree: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Coalition Agreements
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让我们求同存异：联盟协议中的争议解决机制
作者：
S. Bowler;I. Indridason;Thomas Bräuninger;M. Debus
研究联盟政治的学者越来越多地开始关注联盟内部的冲突。在这里，我们研究联盟协议在管理内部冲突中的作用。我们认为，在联盟形成时制定政策协议（例如，通过制定非常详细的政策平台）和通过制定解决政策争端的程序来推迟问题的解决之间存在权衡。我们认为，当联盟意识形态异质且联盟政党规模不同时，这种权衡越来越有可能得到解决，而有利于依赖正式的争端解决机制。我们使用1990年至2013年间德国Länder的数据来验证我们的理论。这些数据使我们能够在保持制度背景不变的情况下，隔离议价情况和意识形态的影响。实证结果支持了我们的主要论点：当联盟内部冲突高时，各方签订的联盟合同较短，但更有可能采用解决冲突的程序。
Scholars of coalition politics have increasingly begun to focus on conflict within coalitions. Here we examine the role of coalition agreements in managing intracoalitional conflict. We argue that there is a trade-off between making policy agreements at the coalition’s formation (e.g., by making very detailed policy platforms) and postponing the issue’s resolution by creating procedures for settling policy disputes. We argue that the trade-off is increasingly likely to be resolved in favor of relying on a formal dispute resolution mechanism when coalitions are ideologically heterogeneous and the coalition parties differ in size. We test our theory using data from the German Länder between 1990 and 2013. These data allow us to isolate the effects of the bargaining situation and ideology while holding the institutional context constant. The empirical results support our main argument: When intracoalition conflict is high, parties write shorter coalition contracts but are more likely to adopt procedures for conflict resolution.
联盟声明、纲领立场和联邦政策对德国各州政府组建的影响
影响因子：
1.3
作者：
Thomas Bräuninger;Marc Debus
通讯作者：
Marc Debus