The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
复制标题
区位模型中均衡的本质
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Carolyn Pitchik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Osborne;Carolyn Pitchik
位置模型适用于经济学和政治学的许多背景。例如，公司选择在哪里开设商店以及生产哪些商品，而政客则选择其平台的性质。在此类模型中，很自然地会寻找具有以下属性的位置集合：在给定所有其他个体的位置的情况下，每个个体的位置都是最佳的。然而，纯策略纳什均衡提供的解决方案既不完整也不令人满意。不完整，因为在许多情况下不存在这种平衡。不能令人满意，因为即使它确实存在，它对于模型的规范也可能不稳健。
Models of location are appropriate in a number of contexts in economics and political science. For example, firms choose where to position stores and which of a spectrum of goods to produce, and politicians select the nature of their platforms. In such models it is natural to look for a collection of locations with the property that the location of each individual is optimal, given the positions of all other individuals. However, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium provides a solution which is both incomplete and unsatisfactory. Incomplete, because in many cases no such equilibrium exists. Unsatisfactory, because even when it does exist it may not be robust to the specification of the model.