Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services
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民主、公共支出和穷人：理解提供公共服务的政治动机
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Stuti Khemani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Keefer;Stuti Khemani
各国政治家提供广泛公益物和减少贫穷的动机各不相同。即使在民主国家，政客们也往往有动机将资源转移到政治租金和私人转移上，使少数公民受益，而牺牲了许多人的利益。这些扭曲可以追溯到政治市场的不完善，在一些国家比其他国家更严重。本文回顾了选民信息不完全、政治承诺缺乏可信度、社会两极分化等因素对政治激励影响的理论和实证研究。这项分析对政策和改革有影响，以改善公共产品的提供和减少贫困。
The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets that are greater in some countries than in others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact on political incentives of incomplete information for voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization. The analysis has implications for policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.