Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb - Intervention myopia in moral intuitions
Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb - Intervention myopia in moral intuitions
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01884.x
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发表时间：
2007-03-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Dieterich, Joern H.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Waldmann, Michael R.;Dieterich, Joern H.
大多数人认为，将一辆即将杀死五个人的电车重新引导到一条只会杀死一个人的轨道上是道德上可以接受的。在这种情况下，人们似乎遵循功利主义的指导方针，宁愿尽量减少受害者的数量。然而，大多数人不会认为这是道德的，有一个访问者在医院被杀，以挽救生命的五个病人，否则将死亡。我们进行了两个实验，在这些相互矛盾的直觉背后，我们找到了一个新的因素。我们表明，道德直觉的影响轨迹的干预在潜在的因果模型。在道德困境中，当干预影响伤害者的路径时，符合功利主义处方的判断更有可能（例如，手推车）比当介入影响潜在患者的路径时（即，受害者）。
Most people consider it morally acceptable to redirect a trolley that is about to kill five people to a track where the trolley would kill only one person. In this situation, people seem to follow the guidelines of utilitarianism by preferring to minimize the number of victims. However, most people would not consider it moral to have a visitor in a hospital killed to save the lives of five patients who were otherwise going to die. We conducted two experiments in which we pinpointed a novel factor behind these conflicting intuitions. We show that moral intuitions are influenced by the locus of the intervention in the underlying causal model. In moral dilemmas, judgments conforming to the prescriptions of utilitarianism are more likely when the intervention influences the path of the agent of harm (e.g., the trolley) than when the intervention influences the path of the potential patient (i.e., victim).