Running risks morally
Running risks morally
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道德地承担风险
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Weatherson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Weatherson
我为规范性外在主义辩护，反对它不能解释道德鲁莽的错误。辩护理由相当简单——道德上的鲁莽并没有错。通过类比有一个直观的论点，即道德鲁莽应该是错误的，这篇论文的大部分内容都是对这个类比的回应。我的回答的一个核心部分是，如果人们被激励去避免道德鲁莽，他们就必须有一种令人不快的动机，迈克尔·史密斯称之为“道德恋物癖”。
I defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort of motivation, what Michael Smith calls “moral fetishism”.