House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis

House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1397607
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发表时间:
2009-08
期刊:
ERN: Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models & Savings (Topic)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Atif R. Mian;Amir Sufi
Atif R. Mian;Amir Sufi
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Atif R. Mian;Amir Sufi

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使用 1997 年至 2008 年个人层面的房主债务和违约数据,我们发现,现有房主以房屋净值增加为抵押进行的借贷,是 2002 年至 2006 年美国家庭杠杆急剧上升以及 2006 年至 2008 年违约增加的很大一部分原因。利用基于土地拓扑的住房供应弹性作为房价增长的工具,我们估计平均房主房屋净值每增加一美元,可赚取 25 至 30 美分。从增加的房屋净值中提取的资金不会用于购买新的房地产或偿还高额信用卡余额,这表明借入的资金可能用于实际支出(即消费或家居装修)。对于年轻家庭、信用评分低的家庭和信用卡初始使用率高的家庭来说,基于房屋净值的借贷更为强劲。 2002年至2006年,房价高升值地区的房主因大量以房屋净值为抵押借款,违约率相对下降,但2006年至2008年的违约率非常高。我们的估计表明,2002年至2006年,每年以房屋净值为基础的借款相当于GDP的2.8%,并占2006年至2008年新增违约的至少34%。
Using individual-level data on homeowner debt and defaults from 1997 to 2008, we show that borrowing against the increase in home equity by existing homeowners is responsible for a significant fraction of both the sharp rise in U.S. household leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in defaults from 2006 to 2008. Employing land topology-based housing supply elasticity as an instrument for house price growth, we estimate that the average homeowner extracts 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase in home equity. Money extracted from increased home equity is not used to purchase new real estate or pay down high credit card balances, which suggests that borrowed funds may be used for real outlays (i.e., consumption or home improvement). Home equity-based borrowing is stronger for younger households, households with low credit scores, and households with high initial credit card utilization rates. Homeowners in high house price appreciation areas experience a relative decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006 as they borrow heavily against their home equity, but experience very high default rates from 2006 to 2008. Our estimates suggest that home equity-based borrowing is equal to 2.8% of GDP every year from 2002 to 2006, and accounts for at least 34% of new defaults from 2006 to 2008.