Monopolists of Scarce Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies
Monopolists of Scarce Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies
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大型拟线性经济中的稀缺信息垄断者和小团体有效性
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-021-00769-x
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Myrna Wooders
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yusuke Kamishiro;Roberto Serrano;Myrna Wooders
在大型准线性经济中，我们提供了充分的条件来建立非空的几个版本的approximatemcores与内生通信。这是通过证明满足激励相容性的approximateex postcore的非空性来完成的。我们的模型的特点是有限数量的代理人的信息是排他性的，我们将术语“稀缺信息的竞争者。”当独家信息的代理商的数量仍然有限，主要参数依赖于一个适应的小团体的有效性条件，以前提出的完全信息的游戏。
In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximateinterimcores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximateex postcores satisfying incentive compatibility. Our model features a finite number of agents whose information is exclusive, whom we shall term “monopolists of scarce information.” When the number of agents with exclusive information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information.