Uniqueness of Nash equilibria in a quantum Cournot duopoly game
Uniqueness of Nash equilibria in a quantum Cournot duopoly game
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DOI：
10.1088/1751-8113/43/14/145303
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发表时间：
2010-04-09
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Sato, Takashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sekiguchi, Yohei;Sakahara, Kiri;Sato, Takashi
研究了一种量子古诺博弈，其经典形式博弈具有多个纳什均衡。尽管经典均衡不是帕累托最优，但量子均衡表现出以下两个性质：（i）如果竞争企业选择的战略变量之间的纠缠测量足够大，则均衡的多重性消失；（ii）战略变量纠缠越强，唯一均衡就越接近最优均衡。
A quantum Cournot game whose classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties: (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.