Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games
Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games
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DOI：
10.1007/s40881-015-0003-5
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发表时间：
2015-12-01
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Tergiman, Chloe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Agranov, Marina;Caplin, Andrew;Tergiman, Chloe
越来越多的证据表明，并非所有实验对象都了解他们的战略环境。我们引入了一个“选择过程”（CP）协议来帮助识别这些主体。当玩家内化他们的决策环境时，该协议以一种激励兼容的方式引发临时选择。我们在修改后的 2/3 猜谜游戏中实现 CP 协议，并使用它通过识别那些在游戏中某个时间做出弱主导选择的玩家来查明幼稚的玩家。在所有时间范围内，这些玩家的平均值接近 50。这与中的假设一致。 K 级理论，即最不复杂的主体（幼稚的主体）在 [1-100] 动作空间中均匀地发挥作用。相比之下，经验丰富的玩家会随着时间的推移表现出理解力增强的迹象。我们发现 CP 协议镜像可以在具有不同时间限制的多种设置中运行。因此，可能值得更广泛地部署以了解决策时间和选择之间的相互作用。
There is growing evidence that not all experimental subjects understand their strategic environment. We introduce a "choice process'' (CP) protocol that aids in identifying these subjects. This protocol elicits in an incentive compatible manner provisional choices as players internalize their decision making environment. We implement the CP protocol in the modified 2/3 guessing game and use it to pinpoint players that are naive by identifying those who make weakly dominated choices some time into the play. At all time horizons these players average close to 50. This is consistent with the assumption in Level-K theory that the least sophisticated subjects (the naive ones) play uniformly over the [1-100] action space. In contrast, sophisticated players show evidence of increased understanding as time passes. We find that the CP protocol mirrors play in multiple setups with distinct time constraints. Hence it may be worth deploying more broadly to understand the interaction between decision time and choice.