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The Deadline Effect and Related Bargaining Phenomena: Some Experimental Studies

The Deadline Effect and Related Bargaining Phenomena: Some Experimental Studies
最后期限效应和相关的讨价还价现象:一些实验研究
批准号:
8815566
负责人:
J.Keith Murnighan
金额:
$0.6万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1988
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1988-08-15 至 1991-01-31

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中文摘要
翻译
这个项目是一个快速增长的研究主体的一部分,这些研究利用实验室实验来测试和丰富经济理论。在这种情况下,经济理论是讨价还价的博弈论方法。在早先的一系列实验中,相对非结构化的讨价还价被允许在固定的时间段内进行,在最后期限之前的最后几秒钟达成的协议惊人地集中在一起。“最后期限效应”似乎相当强劲,因为与协议条款的分配或不一致的频率相比,协议随时间的分配似乎对各种实验性操纵的敏感性要小得多。这个项目中的实验既是为了更好地了解截止日期的影响,也是为了调查理论文献中不同部分提出的特定假设。实验研究将继续调查观察到的最后期限效应对讨价还价机制变化和不同类型最后期限的稳健性。例如,早期实验中使用的尖锐截止日期被一个截止日期所取代,在这个截止日期之后,游戏突然结束的可能性是肯定的,而且不断上升。其中一个主要假设是,截止日期效应源于一种筛选效应,类似于被视为不完全信息模型的分离均衡。这个项目推导并实验测试了一个关于哪些因素可能被筛选的理论。在自然发生的谈判中,最后一刻达成的协议既不罕见,也不是难以遵守的。但标准的讨价还价理论并不能预测或解释截止日期效应。这个项目提供了第一个关于截止日期效应的科学研究,它扩展了讨价还价理论,以捕捉导致截止日期效应发生的因素。
英文摘要
This project is part of a rapidly growing body of research that uses laboratory experiments to test and enrich economic theory. In this case the economic theory is the game theoretic approach to bargaining. In a series of earlier experiments in which relatively unstructured bargaining was allowed to proceed during a fixed time period, there was a striking concentration of agreements reached in the very last seconds before the deadline. The "deadline effect" appears to be quite robust, in the sense that the distribution of agreements over time appears to be much less sensitive to the various experimental manipulations than is the distribution of the terms of agreement or the frequency of disagreement. The experiments in this project are designed both to obtain a better understanding of the effect of deadlines, and to investigate particular hypotheses raised by various parts of the theoretical literature. The experimental research will continue to investigate the robustness of the observed deadline effect to changes in the mechanics of bargaining and to different kinds of deadlines. For example, the sharp deadline used in earlier experiments is replaced by a deadline after which there is a positive and rising probability that the game will end abruptly. One of the main hypotheses is that the deadline effect arises out of a screening effect similar to what is seen as separating equilibria of incomplete information models. This project derives and experimentally tests a theory about what factors might be screened for. Last-minute agreements are neither uncommon nor overwhelmingly difficult to observe in naturally occurring negotiations. But the deadline effect is not predicted or explained by standard bargaining theories. This project provides the first scientific study of deadline effects and it extends bargaining theory to capture the factors which cause deadline effects to occur.
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会议论文
Experimental Investigations of Bargaining Behavior
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