Sequential Models of Regulation with Limited Commitment

这一研究项目对我们理解商业监管具有重要的方法论和实质性贡献。在方法上，大多数关于监管行为的大量文献都假设监管机构是监管环境中的“先行者”，并能够承诺建立激励机制，促使被监管公司如实披露其私人信息或采取代价高昂的隐藏行动。本项目研究监管价格和标准制定，监管机构通常不愿意或不能对具体的监管行动或政策做出可信的承诺。实质上，这项研究为技术强制标准提供了新的见解。强制技术法规是指该机构制定的标准成本高昂，甚至不可能利用现有技术达到的标准。这是一类重要而有趣的问题，因为强制技术标准制定被用于环境监管、产品和职业安全监管以及产品功效和耐用性监管。该项目的重点是有限的监管承诺对受监管企业的序贯均衡定价和投资策略的影响。首先，在标准制定的背景下研究技术强制监管。强调了对公司投资于新的合规技术和标准的跨期演变的激励。其次，该项目考虑了一个价格监管模型，在该模型中，监管者在公司进行资本投资后决定公司的费率结构。第三，研究了监管承诺对服务质量的影响。

This research project makes important methodological and substantive contributions to our understanding of business regulation. Methodologically, most of the sizable literature on regulatory behavior assumes that the regulator is a "first-mover" in the regulatory setting and is able to commit to incentive mechanisms which induce the regulated firm to truthfully reveal its private information or undertake costly hidden actions. This project examines regulatory price and standard setting where regulators are often unwilling or unable to make credible commitments to specific regulatory actions or policies. Substantively, the research provides new insights into technology-forcing standards. Technology-forcing regulations are those in which the agency writes a standard that is costly, or even impossible to meet using current technology. This is an important and interesting class of problems because technology- forcing standard setting is used in environmental regulation, regulation of product and occupational safety, and regulation of product efficacy and durability. The project focuses on the effects of limited regulatory commitment on sequential equilibrium pricing and investment strategies by regulated firms. First technology-forcing regulation is studied in a standard setting context. The incentives for the firm to invest in new compliance technologies and the intertemporal evolution of standards are emphasized. Second, the project considers a model of price regulation in which the regulator determines the firm's rate structure after it has made its investment in capital. Third, the effects of regulatory commitment on the quality of service are studied.