Sequential Models of Regulation with Limited Commitment

该研究项目使重要的方法和 对我们理解商业的实质性贡献 调控 从方法论上讲，大多数关于 监管行为假定监管者是“先行者” 在监管环境中，并能够致力于激励 促使受监管公司如实披露的机制 它的私人信息或采取昂贵的隐藏行动。 这 项目审查监管价格和标准制定， 监管机构往往不愿意或无法使可信的 对具体监管行动或政策的承诺。 实质上，这项研究提供了新的见解， 技术强制标准。 技术强制性法规 机构编写的标准成本很高，或 甚至不可能用现有的技术来实现。 这是一 重要而有趣的一类问题，因为技术- 在环境监管中采用强制性标准制定， 产品和职业安全的监管， 产品功效和耐用性。 该项目的重点是有限的监管的影响 序列均衡定价与投资承诺 受监管企业的战略。 第一次技术强迫 监管是在标准制定的背景下进行研究的。 的 激励公司投资于新的合规技术 和标准的跨期演变。 第二，该项目考虑了一种价格管制模式， 监管机构决定公司的利率结构后， 已经进行了资本投资。 第三，影响 研究了服务质量的监管承诺问题。

This research project makes important methodological and substantive contributions to our understanding of business regulation. Methodologically, most of the sizable literature on regulatory behavior assumes that the regulator is a "first-mover" in the regulatory setting and is able to commit to incentive mechanisms which induce the regulated firm to truthfully reveal its private information or undertake costly hidden actions. This project examines regulatory price and standard setting where regulators are often unwilling or unable to make credible commitments to specific regulatory actions or policies. Substantively, the research provides new insights into technology-forcing standards. Technology-forcing regulations are those in which the agency writes a standard that is costly, or even impossible to meet using current technology. This is an important and interesting class of problems because technology- forcing standard setting is used in environmental regulation, regulation of product and occupational safety, and regulation of product efficacy and durability. The project focuses on the effects of limited regulatory commitment on sequential equilibrium pricing and investment strategies by regulated firms. First technology-forcing regulation is studied in a standard setting context. The incentives for the firm to invest in new compliance technologies and the intertemporal evolution of standards are emphasized. Second, the project considers a model of price regulation in which the regulator determines the firm's rate structure after it has made its investment in capital. Third, the effects of regulatory commitment on the quality of service are studied.