Organizational Processes with Incomplete Contracts

契约不完整的组织流程

• 批准号: 9320856
• 负责人: Julio Rotemberg
• 金额: $ 11.93万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-07-01 至 1997-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9320856&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Organizational; Processes; Incomplete; Contracts

9320856 Rotemberg This research explores two related issues of organization structure. The first issue is why conflicts arise and why the conflicts take on predictable forms. The second aim is to understand the process for allocating formal authority. In the study the basic question that is asked is which groups and individuals tend to be put in charge of various decisions? In order to understand the process, the study concentrates on the canonical conflict between marketing and production departments. Usually, the manufacturing section wants to produce relatively few products on a large scale while the marketing section would prefer to have a "complete product line". One explanation for this is that past activity within the firm has led employees in different areas to learn different things. On the second issue of formal authority, the study seeks to develop a model where costs to information flow lead firms to put certain individuals in authority but the authority and power do not always reside in the same person. The results from this study would provide a basis for understanding the cases where firms benefit from putting valuable employees in authority and those where they do not. ***

9320856 Rotemberg本研究探讨了组织结构的两个相关问题。第一个问题是为什么会产生冲突，为什么冲突会以可预测的形式出现。第二个目标是理解分配正式权力的过程。 在这项研究中提出的基本问题是，哪些群体和个人倾向于负责各种决策？为了理解这一过程，本研究集中在营销和生产部门之间的典型冲突。通常，制造部门希望大规模生产相对较少的产品，而营销部门则希望拥有“完整的产品线”。对此的一种解释是，公司内部过去的活动导致不同领域的员工学习不同的东西。关于正式权威的第二个问题，本研究试图建立一个模型，其中信息流的成本导致企业将某些个人置于权威地位，但权威和权力并不总是存在于同一个人身上。这项研究的结果将提供一个基础，了解企业受益于把有价值的员工在权威和那些他们没有。 ***