Complexity Contract and Compensation
Complexity Contract and Compensation
批准号:
9709333
负责人:
W. Bentley MacLeod
金额:
$22.8万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1997
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1997-08-01 至 2001-09-30
中文摘要
点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要
英文摘要
Project Abstract The role of classical contract law is to permit individuals to enter freely into obligations that can be enforced by the courts if necessary. Much of modern intervention by courts into the realm of private contract is based upon the fact that individuals do not always understand the implications of their contractual obligations at the time of signing a contract. In other cases unforeseen events, such as a contractor becoming ill or a worker having an accident, may not have been anticipated at the time the contract was signed. While it is widely recognized that bounded rationality on the part of individuals may lead to mistakes in contract formation, we currently do not have a good understanding of the appropriate way to model bounded rationality that can be used to study the issue of contract formation. This project consists of four parts. First a model of bounded rationality is developed that can be used to better understand errors human decision making, particularly during contract formation. Secondly this model is applied to the problem of contract formation in the employment relationship. It is shown how current employment institutions, such as employment at will, are efficient responses to the problem of contract formation between boundedly rational individuals. This work provides insight into the formation of labor law. The third part of the project extends these ideas to the problem of firm ownership. Using insights from recent work in cognitive psychology, this work formalizes the notion of ``judgment'' on the part of an entrepreneur. It is shown that it is efficient to allocate ownership rights (rather than have joint ownership) to those individuals that have superior abilities in judging worker quality. The fourth part of the project explores the dynamic implications of bounded rationality. In particular, the project will study the ability for firms to adjust their contractual obligations in the face of new information and technical change. An important issue is to better understand why organizations often fail, rather than take advantage of new and superior technologies. In addition to the construction of theoretical models, the implications of the models are tested empirically.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: What's in a Name? The Effect of Changing Definitions of "Employer" on Worker Outcomes
-
批准号:1949415
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$2.92万
-
财政年份:2020
-
负责人:W. Bentley MacLeod
-
依托单位:
A Study Into the Effect of Employment Conditions Upon Judicial Behavior and Performance
-
批准号:1260875
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$22.8万
-
财政年份:2013
-
负责人:W. Bentley MacLeod
-
依托单位:
First Do No Harm? The Effects of Tort Reform on Outcomes and Procedures at Birth.
-
批准号:0617829
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$19.31万
-
财政年份:2006
-
负责人:W. Bentley MacLeod
-
依托单位:
The Evolution of Investment Conventions
-
批准号:0095606
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$10.96万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:W. Bentley MacLeod
-
依托单位:
海外基金