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Models of Time Inconsistency and Self Control

Models of Time Inconsistency and Self Control
时间不一致和自我控制模型
批准号:
9709485
负责人:
Matthew Rabin
金额:
$25.38万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1997
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1997-09-01 至 2000-08-31

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中文摘要
翻译
摘要尽管经济学家假设跨期偏好是时间一致的,但有证据表明,一个人在较早时刻相对于较晚时刻对幸福的相对偏好随着较早时刻的接近而增加。这就是说,很多人都有自我控制的问题,我们每时每刻都在追求即时的满足,而不是我们自己所希望的。这一提议试图建立正式的经济模型,以这种心理上现实的时间-不一致的偏好为基础,建立在早期模型的基础上,并在其上扩展。在最简单的模型中,一个人必须在一定数量的时间段内恰好参与一项活动一次,在每个时刻选择现在做还是以后做。此模型中的结果取决于两个区别。首先,选择是否涉及显著成本--一项行动的成本是直接的,但任何回报都是延迟的--还是涉及显著的回报--一项行动的回报是即时的,但任何成本都是延迟的?其次,人们是经验丰富--他们预见到未来的自我控制问题--还是他们天真--他们没有预见到这些自我控制问题?给出了一些简单的结果。天真的人拖延活动会付出巨大的代价,而提前--做得太快--活动会有显著的回报。如果成本很高,复杂会减轻拖延症,甚至会导致人们比没有自我控制问题的人更早地进行这项活动。如果回报显著,老练就会加剧成见。这些行为结果具有相应的福利含义:对于显著的代价,轻微的自控问题只有在一个人天真的时候才会严重损害一个人,而对于显著的回报,轻微的自控问题只有在一个人成熟的时候才会严重损害一个人。这位研究人员和他的合著者将单一活动模型的见解应用于不同的经济应用。在一个项目中,他们分析了对天真的拖延者的最优激励。研究结果指出了两个主要教训。首先,与代理人不是拖延者相比,旨在诱导高效行为的激励措施通常是“平稳的”--代理人如果拖延完成一项任务,将受到比拖延的真实成本更严厉的惩罚。其次,当不确定代理人是否有确切的拖延倾向时,即使在延误的真实成本是“固定的”的环境中,也可以使用“最后期限”激励计划来最大化效率:代理人一开始将因拖延而受到温和的惩罚或根本不受惩罚,但过了一段时间后就会因延误而受到严厉的惩罚。这种激励鼓励那些没有拖延倾向的人等待完成任务的效率(即,如果结果证明任务成本太高,不要立即完成任务),同时确保那些有严重拖延倾向的人不会拖延太久。研究人员的主要项目是研究自我控制问题在成瘾商品消费中的作用。经济学家最近的一些理论和实证研究在理解上瘾商品的症结方面取得了创新:虽然消费商品(例如吸烟)可能对人的健康有害,但过去对这些商品的较高消费会增加一个人消费商品的边际效用,因此随着时间的推移,这个人可能会保持或增加对商品的消费,同时对自己造成越来越多的伤害。然而,这些模型使用了理性选择框架,假设人们对自己未来的行为既有时间一致的偏好,又有正确的预期。这个项目涉及自我控制问题的含义,以及对成瘾商品有相同潜在偏好的人的复杂程度的不同假设,就像这些理性选择模型中的情况一样。结果与成熟度在对商品上瘾的倾向中所起的作用有关。如果上瘾是不可逆转的--一个人每吃一次令人上瘾的东西,她就知道这会永远增加她对这种好东西的渴望--一个对自我控制问题很老练的人比一个天真的人更有可能上瘾。NA‗─让你现在更愿意抵制诱惑,因为你(天真地)认为,现在放纵的后果将是你将带着你无法满足的渴望度过余生。如果你很老练,并因此意识到你很可能会上瘾,你就更有可能屈服于渴望--因为你意识到唯一的代价是你会更早上瘾。对于(更现实的)情况来说,逻辑是非常不同的,在这种情况下,克制住一种令人上瘾的活动将有助于一个人摆脱上瘾。这位研究人员推测,那些对自己的自我控制问题天真的人会消费大量令人上瘾的产品--并变得并保持上瘾--天真地认为他们明天就会戒烟。这位研究人员还计划进行许多其他项目,将更多的心理现实主义融入到经济学中。
英文摘要
Abstract Though economists assume that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent, evidence suggests that a person's relative preference for well-being at an earlier moment over a later moment increases as the earlier moment gets closer. That is, many people have a self-control problem, and moment-by-moment we pursue immediate gratification more than we ourselves wish we would. This proposa1 attempts to develop formal economic models of such psychologically realistic time-inconsistent preferences, building from and expanding on earlier models. In the simplest model, a person must engage in an activity exactly once during some number of periods, choosing at each moment whether to do it now or do it later. Results in this model depend on two distinctions. First, do choices involve salient costs - where the costs of an action are immediate but any rewards are delayed - or do they involve salient rewards - where the rewards of an action are immediate but any costs are delayed? Second, are people sophisticated - they foresee future self-control problems - or are they naive - they do not anticipate these self-control problems? Some simple results are derived. Naive people procrastinate activities with salient costs and preproperate - do too soon - activities with salient rewards. If costs are salient, sophistication mitigates procrastination, and can even lead people to do the activity sooner than if they had no self-control problem. If rewards are salient, sophistication exacerbates preproperation. These behavioral results have corresponding welfare implications: With salient costs, mild self-control problems can severely damage a person only if she is naive, while with salient rewards mild self-control problems can severely damage a person only if she is sophisticated. The investigator and his co-author apply the insights of the one-activity model to different economic appli cations. In one project, they analyze optimal incentives for naive procrastinators. The findings indicate two major lessons. First, incentives designed to induce efficient behavior will in general be `steeper` than if agents were not procrastinators - agents will be punished for delay in completing a task more harshly than corresponds to the true cost of delay. Second, when there is uncertainty about the exact propensity of agents to procrastinate, then even in environments where the true cost of delay is `stationary`, `deadline` incentive schemes may be used to max imize efficiency: The agent will at first be punished mildly or not at all for delay, but then after some date be punished severely for delay. Such incentives encourage those with little propensity to procrastinate to wait until it is efficient to do the task (i.e., not do the task right away if it turns out to be too costly), while assuring that those with a severe propensity to procrastinate do not delay too long. The investigator's major project is the study of the role of self-control problems in the consumption of addictive goods. Some recent theoretical and empirical research by economists has been innovative in understanding the crux of addictive goods: While consuming goods (e.g., smoking cigarettes) may be harmful to a person's wellbeing, higher past consumption of those goods increases a person's marginal utility of consuming the good, so that the person may maintain or increase her consumption of the good over time while doing more and more harm to herself. These models, however, use a rational-choice framework, where people are assumed to have both time-consistent preferences and correct expectations about their future behavior. This project concerns the implications of a self-control problem and varied assumptions about sophistication for people with the same underlying preferences for addictive goods as in these rational-choice models. Results pertain to the role that sophistication plays in the propensity to get addicted to goods. If an addiction is irreversible - every time a person takes a `hit` of an addictive good, she knows it will forever increase her craving for that good - a person who is sophisticated about her self-control problem will be more likely than a person who is naive to become addicted. Na‗vet─ makes you more willing to resist temptation now, because you (naively) believe that the consequences of indulging now will be that you will 1ive the rest of your life with a craving you won't fulfill. If you are sophisticated, and hence realize it is likely you will get addicted, you will be more likely to cave in to a craving - because you realize the only cost is that you will get addicted a bit sooner. The logic is very different for the (more realistic) case where refraining from an addictive activity will help a person become unhooked. The investigator conjectures that people who are naive about their self-control problem will consume a lot of an addictive product - and become and stay addicted - under the naive belief that they will quit tomorrow. The investigator also plans to pursue many other projects that incorporate greater psychological realism into eco nomics.
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Collaborative Research on Self-Control and Consumer Choice
  • 批准号:
    0518635
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $11.95万
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 负责人:
    Matthew Rabin
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research on Behavioral Economics
  • 批准号:
    0214147
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $22.65万
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 负责人:
    Matthew Rabin
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research on Behavioral Models of Intertemporal Choice
  • 批准号:
    0079266
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $5.26万
  • 财政年份:
    2000
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    Matthew Rabin
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Incorporating More Realistic Psychological Assumptions into Economics
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    9210323
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  • 资助金额:
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    1992
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