Information Processing and Incentives in Markets and Bureaucracies

市场和官僚机构中的信息处理和激励

• 批准号: 9711303
• 负责人: Timothy Van Zandt
• 金额: $ 13.77万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-08-01 至 1999-04-09
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9711303&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Processing; Incentives; Markets; Bureaucracies

The research will extend work on information processing in organizations including (a) a model of real-time hierarchical resource allocation that distinguishes between and exhibits decentralized information processing and decentralized decisionmaking, (b) models of markets as systems for aggregating information and calculating allocations, comparing the computational efficiency of various market an bureaucratic mechanisms, (c) models of the relationships between incentive constraints and information processing constraints, (d) models of strategic interactions between autonomous organizations each of which is controlled by multiple boundedly-rational agents, and (e) to provide foundations for modeling bounded rationality and learning in dynamic settings. The primary approach to be used in this project is modeling the process of multi-agent decisionmaking in organizations as real-time decentralized control.

该研究将扩展组织中信息处理的工作，包括（a）区分并展示分散信息处理和分散决策的实时分层资源分配模型，（B）作为汇总信息和计算分配系统的市场模型，比较各种市场和官僚机制的计算效率，（c）激励约束和信息处理约束之间的关系模型，（d）自治组织之间的战略互动模型，每个自治组织都由多个有限理性代理人控制，（e）为有限理性建模和动态设置中的学习提供基础。在这个项目中使用的主要方法是建模的过程中的多代理决策的组织实时分散控制。