Using Option Pricing to Value Commitment Flexibility in Multi-Agent Systems

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

This research aims to develop a domain-independent computational model to support, in a uniform manner, many complex issues that arise in multi-agent contracting, such as modeling commitment flexibility in a contract, valuing a contract under assumptions of uncertainty, risk reduction, making decisions in situations of asymmetric information, or situations of sequential subcontracting where each agent must decide to subcontract part of its current contract to others. The approach is based on financial option pricing theory. This research will extend this theory to model contracts that have no analogs in financial options, such as contract quality guarantees and multiple sequential subcontracting. To evaluate the research, a multi-agent simulation testbed will be developed and utilized to conduct empirical studies that can answer significant theoretical questions. Questions to be studied for evaluation include the effects on the overall multi-agent society of different model assumptions such as stationary vs. non-stationary stochastic processes for modeling environmental uncertainty, different contracting strategies, and examinations of the value of information especially for asymmetrical information scenarios. Real world domains of theoretical and practical significance such as supply contracting and electronic commerce will be used to provide realistic problem scenarios. It is expected that the proposed research will contribute to the development of general computational models of multi-agent contracting that can answer fundamental research questions and can serve as a basis for designing efficient automated contracting systems.