Collaborative Research: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Observation of others versus Cheap Talk as Coordination Devices

在简单的一次性战略情况下，个人如何实现“良好结果”的协调？一种被广泛探索的可能性是，他们参与了某种游戏前的交流——廉价的谈话——在这种交流中，他们努力说服对方他们打算玩的动作。另一种较少被探索的可能性是，个体在决定采取何种行动时，会考虑同伴过去的行动。虽然这两种可能性已经分别考虑过，但还没有研究比较这两种装置作为解决协调问题的辅助工具的相对重要性。该项目涉及一项以人类为对象的实验，以比较廉价的谈话和对过去行为的观察作为实现良好结果协调的手段所发挥的作用。廉价谈话或观察过去行为的效果也将与不允许廉价谈话或观察过去行为的标准（对照）情况进行比较。在所有情况下，受试者都将玩简单的双人游戏，并根据他们在每个游戏中的表现获得报酬。该实验的结果将用于扩展博弈论模型，以研究个人如何将公平概念纳入其决策，以及他们如何利用战略环境中可用的不同类型的信息。在更综合的层面上，实验结果将更好地理解廉价言论和对过去行为的观察作为在简单的一次性战略竞赛中确保“好结果”的手段的相对优点。这些信息不仅对经济学家有用，而且对更广泛的受众有用，包括政策制定者和其他能够影响公众行为或期望的人。

How do individuals achieve coordination on `good outcomes` in simple one shot strategic situations? One much explored possibility is that they engage in some kind of preplay communication- cheap talk-in which they endeavor to convince one another of the actions they intend to play. Another, less explored, possibility is that individuals take account of the past actions of their partners when deciding which actions to play. While these two possibilities have been considered separately, there has been no research that compares the relative importance of these two devices as aids in solving coordination problems. This project involves an experiment with human subjects that will allow for a comparison of the roles played by cheap talk and observation of past actions as devices for achieving coordination on good outcomes. The effect of cheap talk or observation of past actions will also be compared with the standard (control) case where cheap talk or observation of past actions is not allowed. In all cases, subjects will play simple two player games and will be paid according to their performance in each game. The results of this experiment will be used to extend game theoretic models of how individuals incorporate notions of fairness into their decisions and how they make use of the different types of information available in strategic environments. At a more aggregate level, the experimental results will provide a better understanding of the relative merits of cheap talk and observation of past actions as devices for ensuring `good outcomes` in simple one shot strategic contests. Such information will be useful not only to economists but to a much wider audience, including policymakers and others who are in a position to influence the actions or expectations of the public.