Assessing the Efficacy of the Laws of War

评估战争法的效力

• 批准号: 0111787
• 负责人: James Morrow
• 金额: $ 18万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-07-01 至 2004-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0111787&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Assessing; Efficacy; Laws; War

This project tests a formal model of the laws of war-formal treaties that seek to limit violence during wartime. These international laws are of particular interest because they shape behavior to the extent that the parties can enforce them on one another or respect their limits on their own. They form the extreme case of the self-enforcing nature of political institutions. The project is a formal treatment of war where there is a strategic competition between two states. They contend for a prize in a war of attrition model where the costs they pay each round depend on the current military balance between the two. In each round, they fight a "battle" where a fixed strategic-form, zero-sum represents the contest of each battle. The outcome of the "battle" game depends on their chosen strategies This determines the shift in the military balance in this round. In equilibrium, a side quits if the military balance moves against them beyond its "break point", which is endogenous to the game. A variant of this game has the costs in a given round depend on the strategies played in the battle game as well as the current military balance.In this model the laws of war are represented as a prewar agreement by both players not to play a set of strategies of the battle game. The question is when such agreements hold in equilibrium. A side considering defecting from such an agreement weighs the short-run benefits of using a banned strategy when: a) the other side cannot retaliate; b) the long-run consequences of both sides being free to use any strategy covered by the agreement; and c) any audience costs it suffers for being the first violator of the agreement. The incentive to defect is assessed by how the "break points" of the two sides shift as a consequence of a defection. The project tests these conclusions by collecting a data set on violations of the laws of war in the 20th century. These data include the major treaties in effect, addressing issues like prisoners of war and chemical weapons, and candidates for agreements that were not legalized in a treaty, such as aerial bombardment. Coding rules for extent and degree of violations are created and compliance with these agreements by warring states in the set of Singer-Small wars during the 20`h century are assessed through consultation with historical sources, primarily secondary sources. This data collection leads to two empirical tests of the models: first, a comparison of whether enforceable agreements as judged by the model are actually observed more often than limits judged unenforceable, and second, a test of the timing of violations, whether they tend to fall early during a war and whether the winning side is more likely to be the violator when they occur when it appears that one side is about to lose.

这个项目测试了战争法的一个正式模型，即试图在战争期间限制暴力的正式条约。这些国际法之所以特别重要，是因为它们在一定程度上塑造了行为，使各方能够相互强制执行，或自行遵守它们的限制。它们构成了政治制度自我实施性质的极端例子。该项目是对两个国家之间存在战略竞争的战争的正式处理。他们在消耗战模式中争夺奖品，每一轮他们支付的费用取决于目前两国之间的军事平衡。在每一轮中，他们打一场“战斗”，其中一个固定的战略形式，零和代表每场战斗的较量。“战斗”游戏的结果取决于他们选择的策略，这决定了这一轮军事平衡的转变。在均衡状态下，如果军事均势对一方不利，超过其“断点”，则一方退出，“断点”是博弈内生的。这个博弈的一个变体是，在给定回合中的成本取决于战斗博弈中的策略以及当前的军事平衡。在这个模型中，战争法则被表示为双方在战前达成的协议，即不使用战斗博弈中的一组策略。问题是，这种协议在什么时候保持平衡。考虑脱离这种协议的一方会权衡使用被禁止的策略的短期利益，前提是：a）另一方无法报复; B）双方都可以自由使用协议所涵盖的任何策略的长期后果; c）它作为第一个违反协议的人所遭受的任何受众成本。叛逃的动机是通过双方的“断点”如何因叛逃而转移来评估的。该项目通过收集一组关于20世纪违反战争法的数据来检验这些结论。 这些数据包括有效的主要条约，涉及战俘和化学武器等问题，以及条约中未合法化的协议的候选人，如空中轰炸。 通过查阅历史资料，主要是二手资料，制定了违反行为的范围和程度的编码规则，并评估了20世纪世纪辛格-小战争中交战国遵守这些协定的情况。 这种数据收集导致两个模型的实证检验：第一，比较是否可执行的协议，判断模型判断实际上更经常观察到的限制判断不可执行，第二，违反的时间，他们是否往往下降在战争期间的早期，是否胜利方更有可能是违反者时，他们发生时，似乎一方即将失去。