Collaborative Research: Anchoring and Insufficient Adjustment in Everyday Judgment

合作研究：日常判断的锚定与不充分调整

• 批准号: 0241544
• 负责人: Nicholas Epley
• 金额: $ 19.99万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-04-01 至 2005-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0241544&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Anchoring; Insufficient; Adjustment

People's judgments are often inordinately influenced by the first information that comes to mind. Judgments of others' perceptions are unduly tied to one's own (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001; Keysar & Barr, 2002), impressions of others' personalities overly influenced by initial dispositional inferences (Gilbert, 2002) and answers to general knowledge questions anchored on irrelevant information considered early in the processing stream (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Wilson, Brekke, & Centerbar, 2002). These effects, and many like them, have traditionally been explained as insufficient adjustment from an initial anchor or starting point, using what Tversky and Kahneman (1974) called the "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic. In short, people make judgments under uncertainty of all kinds by starting with (or anchoring on) information that is presented to their attention or that comes quickly and automatically to mind, and then serially adjusting their initial impression until an acceptable judgment is reached. Although originally used to explain numerical estimates, anchoring and adjustment has figured prominently in numerous theories of social judgment.Recent evidence has cast doubt on the "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic. In particular, it has come to light that the experimental paradigm long used to investigate anchoring and adjustment does not, in fact, involve adjustment at all. These results, accompanied by failures to find conclusive evidence for a process of adjustment outside this paradigm, have led some researchers to reject the anchoring and adjustment heuristic altogether (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). Research conducted with funding from a current NSF grant indicates that this conclusion is premature: The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is alive and well when one looks in the right places (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). This research indicates that people adjust in a serial fashion from anchors they automatically generate themselves as a value known to be close to the right answer but in need of tinkering. It appears, furthermore, that the processing of such "self-generated" anchors is common and pervasive in everyday life, making an accurate understanding of them critical to a broader understanding of social judgment.The studies proposed here are designed to expand the work begun on the existing grant by: a) developing new methodologies for tracking the operation of true anchoring and adjustment; b) more clearly identifying the exact nature of anchors that stimulate adjustment and those that do not; c) expanding the scope of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic beyond questions of general knowledge and into social judgment more generally; and d) developing techniques for overcoming insufficient adjustment.

人们的判断往往会受到脑海中出现的第一个信息的过度影响。 对他人感知的判断与自己的感知过度相关（Gilovich Savitsky，1999; Savitsky，Epley，Gilovich，2001; Keysar巴尔，2002），对他人人格的印象过度受初始倾向性推断的影响（吉尔伯特，2002），以及对一般知识问题的回答锚定在处理流早期考虑的不相关信息上（Chapman约翰逊，2002; Wilson，Brekke，Centerbar，2002）。 这些效应，以及许多类似的效应，传统上被解释为初始锚或起点的调整不足，使用特沃斯基和卡尼曼（1974）所谓的“锚定和调整”启发式。 简而言之，人们在各种不确定性的情况下做出判断，首先（或锚定在）他们注意到的信息或迅速自动出现在脑海中的信息，然后连续调整他们的初始印象，直到达到可接受的判断。 锚定和调整最初是用来解释数字估计的，但它在社会判断的众多理论中占有重要地位，最近的证据对“锚定和调整”启发式提出了质疑。 特别是，人们发现，长期以来用于研究锚定和调整的实验范式实际上根本不涉及调整。 这些结果，伴随着未能找到确凿的证据，在这个范式之外的调整过程，导致一些研究人员拒绝锚定和调整启发式（查普曼约翰逊，2002）。 由美国国家科学基金会（NSF）资助的研究表明，这个结论还为时过早：当人们在正确的地方寻找时，锚定和调整启发式仍然存在（Epley Gilovich，2001）。 这项研究表明，人们以一种连续的方式从锚点进行调整，他们自动生成一个接近正确答案的值，但需要修补。 此外，这种“自我生成”锚的处理在日常生活中是普遍和普遍的，因此准确理解它们对于更广泛地理解社会判断至关重要。这里提出的研究旨在通过以下方式扩展现有资助的工作：a）开发跟踪真正锚定和调整操作的新方法; B）更清楚地识别刺激调整和不刺激调整的锚的确切性质; c）将锚定和调整启发式的范围扩展到一般知识问题之外，并更普遍地进入社会判断; d）开发克服调整不足的技术。