Understanding Institutions

Prop ID：SES-0443465 P I：Acemoglu，Daron组织：麻省理工学院标题：了解机构现在有一个广泛的共识，即机构的跨国差异对长期经济表现很重要。理解为什么各国的制度不同，制度的哪些具体层面更重要，以及制度在实践中如何发挥作用才刚刚开始。该提案概述了关于这些主题的一些正在进行的项目和未来的项目。进行中的项目：第一个进行中的项目探索前欧洲殖民地不同层面的机构的历史差异，以确定经济机构不同组成部分的因果关系。正在进行的第二个项目试图打开“财产权”的黑匣子。它调查了政治权力在社会中不同分配的成本和收益，这转化为为社会中的不同群体创造更好的财产权(更好的激励)。它表明，在寡头结构和民主社会之间存在着一种动态的权衡。寡头结构为老牌生产商提供了良好的投资激励，同时也创造了一个不公平的竞争环境。民主社会制约了现有生产商的权力，但也可能推行扭曲的(民粹主义)再分配政策。未来项目：该提案还概述了三个新项目。第一个模型构建了一个评估弱国与强国的成本和收益的模型。尽管最近的许多政治经济学文献强调了国家不受制约的权力的代价，但许多政治学家和社会学家认为，无法增税和提供公共产品的“弱国”是欠发达的一个主要原因。这个项目勾勒出一种模式，在这种模式下，由自私自利的统治者执掌的政府必须在基础设施或公共产品方面进行生产性投资。在这种设置中，强国和弱国都被它们提高税收、创造成本的能力所参数化。强州不鼓励公民投资，但弱州不会给尺子提供足够的未来租金来鼓励他们的投资。这一框架使潜在的、积极的和规范的政府组织理论得以发展。其次，该项目将研究机构改革的后果，利用法国大革命蔓延到比利时、荷兰、瑞士、德国西部和意大利北部的机会，用新的掌权者取代现有的寡头政治。最后一个项目是关于开发领导力理论的新工作，以了解机构在实践中如何运作，以及它们如何在信息分散的情况下实现代理人之间的协调。智力优点：本提案中概述的项目对于理解各国机构为何不同以及这对经济增长潜力的影响至关重要。这项工作虽然还处于初级阶段，但已经对许多经济学分支产生了重大影响，包括发展经济学、宏观经济学、公共金融学、劳动经济学、契约理论和产业组织。更广泛的影响：了解经济繁荣的制度根源可以有助于更好地制定政策，最近的研究结果已在各种政策辩论中发挥了作用。这项工作的经验部分涉及构建新的数据集，然后可以被其他研究人员使用。PI之前的工作导致了新数据集的开发，这些数据集已被大量研究人员和研究生使用，并已用于本科生和研究生课堂的教学。

ABSTRACTProp ID: SES-0443465 P I: Acemoglu, Daron Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Title: Understanding Institutions There is now a broad consensus that cross-country differences in institutions are important for long-run economic performance. Work on understanding why institutions differ across countries, which specific dimensions of institutions matter more, and how institutions function in practice is just starting. This proposal outlines a number of ongoing and future projects on these topics. Ongoing projects: The first ongoing project explores historical variation in different dimensions of institutions among the former European colonies to identify the causal effect of different components of economic institutions. The second ongoing project attempts to open the black box of "property rights". It investigates the costs and benefits of different distributions of political power in society, which translate into creating better property rights (better incentives) for different groups in society. It shows the presence of a dynamic trade-off between oligarchic structures that give good investment incentives to established producers, while also creating a non-level playing field, versus democratic societies, which check the power of incumbent producers, but also may pursue distortionary (populist) redistributive policies. Future projects: The proposal also outlines three new projects. The first constructs a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of weak versus strong states. Although much of the recent political economy literature emphasizes the costs of unchecked power by the state, many political scientists and sociologists view "weak states," which are unable to raise taxes and provide public goods, as a major reason for underdevelopment. This project outlines a model in which the government, run by a self-interested ruler, must undertake productive investments in infrastructure or public goods. In this setup, both strong and weak states are parameterized by their ability to raise taxes, create costs. Strong states discourage investment by citizens, but weak states do not give enough future rents to rulers to encourage their investments. This framework enables the development of potential positive and normative theories of the organization of government. Second, the project will study the consequences of institutional reform replacing an established oligarchy by new power-holders, exploiting the spread of the French Revolution to Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, western Germany and northern Italy. The final project is on new work towards developing a theory of leadership to understand how institutions function in practice, and how they can achieve coordination among agents with decentralized information.Intellectual Merit: The projects outlined in this proposal are central to the development of an understanding of why institutions vary across countries and how this impacts on the potential for economic growth. This work, though very much in its infancy, has had a major effect on many branches of economics, including development economics, macroeconomics, public finance, labor economics, contract theory and industrial organization. Broader impacts: An understanding of the institutional roots of economic prosperity can contribute to better policymaking, and results from recent research have featured in various policy debates. The empirical part of the work involves construction of new datasets, which can then be used by other researchers. Previous work by the PI has led to the development of new datasets that have been used by a large number of researchers and graduate students, and have been utilized for teaching in undergraduate and graduate classes.