Understanding Institutions

摘要：作者：Acemoglu， Daron组织：麻省理工学院标题：理解制度现在有一个广泛的共识，即制度的跨国差异对长期经济表现很重要。理解各国制度差异的原因、制度的哪些具体方面更为重要，以及制度在实践中如何运作的工作才刚刚开始。本提案概述了关于这些主题的一些正在进行和未来的项目。正在进行的项目：第一个正在进行的项目探讨了前欧洲殖民地制度不同维度的历史变化，以确定经济制度不同组成部分的因果关系。第二个正在进行的项目试图打开“产权”的黑盒子。它调查了社会中不同政治权力分配的成本和收益，这转化为为社会中不同群体创造更好的产权（更好的激励）。它显示了寡头结构与民主社会之间存在动态权衡，寡头结构为老牌生产商提供了良好的投资激励，同时也创造了一个不公平的竞争环境，民主社会制约了现有生产商的权力，但也可能追求扭曲的（民粹主义的）再分配政策。未来项目：该提案还概述了三个新项目。第一部分构建了一个模型来评估弱国家与强国家的成本和收益。尽管最近的许多政治经济学文献都强调了国家不受约束的权力的代价，但许多政治科学家和社会学家认为，无法提高税收和提供公共产品的“弱国”是不发达的主要原因。该项目概述了一种模式，在这种模式下，由自私自利的统治者管理的政府，必须在基础设施或公共产品方面进行生产性投资。在这种情况下，强弱州的参数化取决于它们提高税收和创造成本的能力。强大的国家不鼓励公民投资，但弱小的国家不会给统治者足够的未来租金来鼓励他们投资。这一框架有助于发展潜在的积极和规范的政府组织理论。其次，该项目将研究制度改革的后果，利用法国大革命向比利时、荷兰、瑞士、德国西部和意大利北部的蔓延，用新的权力掌权者取代老牌寡头。最后一个项目是关于发展领导理论的新工作，以了解机构在实践中如何运作，以及它们如何在信息分散的代理人之间实现协调。智力价值：本提案中概述的项目对于理解各国制度差异的原因及其对经济增长潜力的影响至关重要。这项工作虽然还处于起步阶段，但对许多经济学分支产生了重大影响，包括发展经济学、宏观经济学、公共财政、劳动经济学、契约理论和产业组织。更广泛的影响：了解经济繁荣的制度根源有助于更好地制定政策，最近的研究结果已成为各种政策辩论的特色。这项工作的实证部分包括构建新的数据集，然后可供其他研究人员使用。PI之前的工作导致了新数据集的开发，这些数据集已被大量研究人员和研究生使用，并已被用于本科和研究生课程的教学。

ABSTRACTProp ID: SES-0443465 P I: Acemoglu, Daron Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Title: Understanding Institutions There is now a broad consensus that cross-country differences in institutions are important for long-run economic performance. Work on understanding why institutions differ across countries, which specific dimensions of institutions matter more, and how institutions function in practice is just starting. This proposal outlines a number of ongoing and future projects on these topics. Ongoing projects: The first ongoing project explores historical variation in different dimensions of institutions among the former European colonies to identify the causal effect of different components of economic institutions. The second ongoing project attempts to open the black box of "property rights". It investigates the costs and benefits of different distributions of political power in society, which translate into creating better property rights (better incentives) for different groups in society. It shows the presence of a dynamic trade-off between oligarchic structures that give good investment incentives to established producers, while also creating a non-level playing field, versus democratic societies, which check the power of incumbent producers, but also may pursue distortionary (populist) redistributive policies. Future projects: The proposal also outlines three new projects. The first constructs a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of weak versus strong states. Although much of the recent political economy literature emphasizes the costs of unchecked power by the state, many political scientists and sociologists view "weak states," which are unable to raise taxes and provide public goods, as a major reason for underdevelopment. This project outlines a model in which the government, run by a self-interested ruler, must undertake productive investments in infrastructure or public goods. In this setup, both strong and weak states are parameterized by their ability to raise taxes, create costs. Strong states discourage investment by citizens, but weak states do not give enough future rents to rulers to encourage their investments. This framework enables the development of potential positive and normative theories of the organization of government. Second, the project will study the consequences of institutional reform replacing an established oligarchy by new power-holders, exploiting the spread of the French Revolution to Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, western Germany and northern Italy. The final project is on new work towards developing a theory of leadership to understand how institutions function in practice, and how they can achieve coordination among agents with decentralized information.Intellectual Merit: The projects outlined in this proposal are central to the development of an understanding of why institutions vary across countries and how this impacts on the potential for economic growth. This work, though very much in its infancy, has had a major effect on many branches of economics, including development economics, macroeconomics, public finance, labor economics, contract theory and industrial organization. Broader impacts: An understanding of the institutional roots of economic prosperity can contribute to better policymaking, and results from recent research have featured in various policy debates. The empirical part of the work involves construction of new datasets, which can then be used by other researchers. Previous work by the PI has led to the development of new datasets that have been used by a large number of researchers and graduate students, and have been utilized for teaching in undergraduate and graduate classes.