CSR/PDOS: Security and Incentives for Overlay Network Infrastructure

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CNS-0509297 CSR/PDOS: Security and Incentives for Overlay NetworkInfrastructureAbstract: Proposed ResearchOverlay network systems have largely been engineered to operate in a world where everynode cooperatively executes the protocol as specified. Nodes either operate correctly, orcease to work altogether (i.e., fail-stop). This model is quite successful when nodescan trust one another, but this limits overlay systems from operating in the more generalcase when they might be operating on untrusted, end-user computers. Such users will beeconomically rational, meaning they will seek to get as much benefit from the network aspossible while contributing as little of their own resources. Our research will examineextensions to these systems where nodes perform accounting, allowing them to trackwhich nodes are and are not performing correctly, making it possible to offer preferentialservice to nodes that offer preferential service in return. These and other relatedtechniques will ultimately result in incentives-compatible designs that enable a newgeneration of peer-to-peer applications, including distributed backup systems, distributedfile systems, and distributed email systems. Our work will be disseminated as part of theFreePastry project, which provides a high-quality and scalable implementation of avariety of overlay network services and is available under a BSD-style license. Likewise,our work will become part of the next-generation Tor anonymous communication system.