Theory and Applications of Repeated Games

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The main goal of my research visit to Yale is to extend my research on relational contracts and the underlying theory of infinitely repeated games. In the paper Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments , joint with Susanne Ohlendorf, we characterize the set of payoffs that two parties can achieve with relational contracts under the assumptions that actions are perfectly observable, side payments are possible and the relational contracts are renegotiation-proof. Our contribution to the literature is to develop for a general framework a simple method to determine optimal relational contracts for any discount factor. In many examples, like long-term buyer-seller relationships, research joint ventures, or illegal collusive agreements, the degree to which other parties’ behavior can be monitored is crucial for the scope of relational contracts. One goal of my research visit is to extend my results to forms of imperfect monitoring that are as general as possible. My host Larry Samuelson, as well as Johannes Hörner, are leading experts in the field of repeated games, whose research has a particular focus on issues of imperfect monitoring. Another goal of my research visit is to learn more about structural econometric methods that allow to estimate firms strategies in repeated interactions. Yale hosts world leading experts in the corresponding field of new empirical industrial organization, like Lanier Benkard, Steve Berry, or Philip Haile. I have the hope that my research visit helps me contributing to economic research and teaching in Germany that combines economic theory and applied econometrics. and econometrics.