Economic Mechanisms for Dynamic Resource Patitioning in Multi-Core Processors
Economic Mechanisms for Dynamic Resource Patitioning in Multi-Core Processors
批准号:
0702275
负责人:
Gabriel Loh
金额:
$17.27万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-09-15 至 2010-08-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
Modern microprocessors contain multiple computing elements (cores) that can perform different computations in parallel. Such multi-core processors, however, must share certain hardware resources (e.g., caches, bus bandwidth, power). Current multi-core implementations do not provide any explicit management of the shared resources, thereby resulting in "free-for-all" behaviors where some cores can consume a large and unfair portion of the shared resources. Such an undisciplined approach can lead to severe performance degradations for the other cores, and even lower overall/aggregate system performance. This project proposes to adapt ideas and techniques from online/Internet auctions to manage shared resources in multi-core processors. The central idea is that by providing each core with a limited budget, all cores will "play nicely" since no single core will be able to take control of an unfair portion of the shared resources. Furthermore, each core can intelligently bid on the resources that it will benefit the most from, leading to improved per-core and overall system performance. An additional advantage of leveraging existing online auction algorithms is that significant analysis has already gone into proving various properties of these algorithms, thereby providing a strong theoretical foundation for the proposed multi-core resource management techniques.
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CAREER: Computer Architecture Foundations for 3D-Integrated High-Performance Microprocessors
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批准号:0643500
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$40.0万
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财政年份:2007
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负责人:Gabriel Loh
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market
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批准号:--
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项目类别:外国学者研究基金
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:HAOFEI Z
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依托单位:
Exploring the Intrinsic Mechanisms of CEO Turnover and Market Reaction: An Explanation Based on Information Asymmetry
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批准号:W2433169
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项目类别:外国学者研究基金项目
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2024
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负责人:HAOFEI ZHANG
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依托单位: