Price Dynamics, Mechanism Choice and Mechanism Design in Markets for Perishable Goods

该奖项是根据2009年美国复苏和再投资法案（公法111-5）资助的。该奖项资助三个实证研究项目，研究易腐商品市场。 在这些市场出售的产品在预先指定的日期后失去价值，无论何时购买，都只能在该日期消费。 我们的目标是了解决定这些市场结果的一般经济力量。 特别是，本研究对拍卖和固定价格作为易腐商品销售方式的优缺点进行了比较，并记录了易腐商品市场的新现象。 它还以新的方式测试市场过程的理论模型。 这些模型提供了一个实证框架，可用于评估价格动态和其他环境中的机制选择。 最后，本计画将发展、评估及测试多单位拍卖的新模型，并探讨可观察到的产品差异，其中许多研究问题对于营运管理的研究与实务也是重要的。 由此产生的更广泛影响可能会改善业务做法和库存管理。

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).This award funds three empirical research projects examining markets for perishable goods. The products sold in these markets lose their value after a pre-specified date, and they can only be consumed on that date no matter when they were purchased. The goal is to understand the general economic forces that determine outcomes in these markets. In particular, the research is interested in comparing the strengths and weaknesses of auctions and fixed prices as ways of selling perishable goods.The research documents new phenomena in perishable goods markets. It also tests theoretical models of market processes in new ways. The models provide an empirical framework that can be used to evaluate price dynamics and the mechanism choice in other settings. Finally, the project develops, estimates, and tests new models of multi-unit auctions with observable product differentiation.Many of these research questions are also important for operations management research and practice. The resulting broader impact may improve business practice and inventory management.