Seeking, storing and supplying information: Information and memory in behavioral Economics

该奖项资助行为经济学理论的研究。 第一个项目开发和分析了一个团队合作的模型，团队成员一起完成昂贵但对社会有价值的任务。 在这种模式下，团队成员记住完成任务所需信息的能力有限。 因此，团队不仅要在行动上合作，还要在建立集体记忆方面合作。 如果一名成员忘记了完成工作所需的关键信息，另一名团队成员必须介入并提醒。 然而，这会产生一种战略性的情况;如果我没有提醒我的队友，整个团队的生产力就会降低，但与我的同事相比，我会显得是一个很强的执行者。第二个项目开发了一个框架，用于检查对客观信息的偏好。 在这个模型中，经济主体对影响特定决策结果的重要条件具有不完全信息。 该研究将测试的想法形式化为一个信息结构，该信息结构与概率分布的集合配对，以世界的每个状态为条件，在包括信息结构的事件上。 PI和她的合作者建立了一个实用程序表示，其中决策者显示选择性的信息寻求时，信息被用来解决非退化决策问题。 决策者可能希望通过模糊自己对真实状态的了解或收集更准确的信息来减轻决策问题的难度，这取决于他的目标在世界不同状态下的冲突。

This award funds research in behavioral economic theory. The first project develops and analyzes a model of teamwork where team members work together to complete costly but socially valuable tasks. In this model, team members have limited ability to remember information they need to complete their tasks. The team must therefore cooperate not just in their actions, but also in building a collective memory. If one member has forgotten key information she needs to complete her part of the job, another team member must step in with a reminder. However, this creates a strategic situation; if I fail to remind my teammate, the team as a whole is less productive, but I will appear to be a strong performer when compared to my co-worker.The second project develops a framework for examining preferences for objective information. In this model, an economic agent has incomplete information about important conditions that affect the results of a specific decision. The research formalizes the idea of a test as an information structure paired with a collection of probability distributions, conditional on each state of the world, over the events comprising the information structure. The PI and her collaborator build a utility representation in which the decision maker displays selective information seeking when information is used towards resolving a nondegenerate decision problem. Depending on how her objectives conflict in different states of the world, a decision maker may wish to mitigate the difficulty of her decision problem by obscuring her knowledge of the true state or gathering more accurate information.