Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science: Signal Costs and Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy

政治学博士论文：信号成本和公众对外交政策的态度

• 批准号: 1423851
• 负责人: Alexander Downes
• 金额: $ 2.14万
• 依托单位: George Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-07-01 至 2016-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1423851&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Political; Science; Signal

This project addresses how states communicate foreign policy motives, and how signals are perceived by the public. It tests the logic of different signaling mechanisms: defensive military policies, domestic policies towards minority groups, involvement in institutional institutions, and 'soft' foreign policies including foreign assistance. Most of these signaling mechanisms are based on the logic of costly signaling, actions that convey credible information about motives because they are costly for the sender to take. States can signal benign motives, for example, by investing in defensive military technology when offensive technology has the advantage. Because making this investment is costly and risky, and actors with more aggressive motives would be unlikely to take this action, buying defense in this scenario allows the state to communicate its benign intent. The project examines whether the logic of costly signaling is sufficient for credible communications of states' preferences.The intellectual merit of this research centers on its theoretical and methodological contributions. The project will contribute to knowledge about states' motives and costly signaling in IR: whether and when motives matter in security affairs, and how a state can communicate its motives. The study attempts to expand the understanding of motives and signaling in three ways. First, it addresses debates over the role of motives by empirically testing competing theories. Second, the project tests the logic of costly signaling by examining the effectiveness of various signaling mechanisms in conveying a state's motives. Third, the study tests a new mechanism, foreign aid policies and peace-keeping activities, that has never been considered as a signal that can indicate states' motives. A separate contribution is methodological. The project provides empirical evidence at the micro-level on the logic of costly signaling. Previous case study research on costly signaling has been unable to clearly distinguish between cause and effect. Survey experiments can overcome this obstacle, and will allow researchers to identify a clear causal relationship between states' actions (signals) and the attitude of the foreign public that observes those actions.This research has the potential to have a broader impact on the security policy community. The study will recommend policy options to decision-makers, and suggest actions to increase national security by conveying their government's preferences to other states. The project will provide basic information on which types of policies are effective in reassuring a potential adversary and to what extent. Additionally, the findings of this research will also be applicable to areas such as social psychology, economics, business, and political science. The project is, fundamentally, about the communication of one's intentions between two or more parties: how actors can make their signals credible. This research will allow scholars to examine attitude formation from such communications. This study will provide lessons to those disciplines on how we can make communication more effective and efficient.

该项目探讨了国家如何传达外交政策的动机，以及公众如何感知这些信号。它测试了不同信号机制的逻辑：防御性军事政策，对少数群体的国内政策，参与机构制度，以及包括外国援助在内的“软”外交政策。大多数这些信号机制都是基于昂贵的信号逻辑，这些行为传达了有关动机的可靠信息，因为它们对发送者来说是昂贵的。例如，当进攻性技术具有优势时，国家可以通过投资于防御性军事技术来表明良好的动机。因为进行这种投资是昂贵和有风险的，而且具有更激进动机的行为者不太可能采取这种行动，在这种情况下购买防御可以让国家传达其善意的意图。该项目考察了昂贵的信号逻辑是否足以可靠地传达国家的偏好。这项研究的学术价值集中在其理论和方法上的贡献。该项目将有助于了解国家的动机和IR中昂贵的信号：动机是否以及何时在安全事务中起作用，以及国家如何传达其动机。该研究试图从三个方面扩展对动机和信号的理解。首先，它通过实证检验竞争理论来解决关于动机作用的争论。第二，该项目通过检查各种信号机制在传达国家动机方面的有效性来测试昂贵信号的逻辑。第三，研究测试了一种新的机制，即对外援助政策和维持和平活动，这从来没有被认为是一个信号，可以表明国家的动机。另一个贡献是方法。该项目提供了微观一级关于昂贵信号逻辑的经验证据。以前关于昂贵信号的案例研究一直无法明确区分因果关系。调查实验可以克服这一障碍，研究人员可以明确国家行为（信号）与观察到这些行为的外国公众态度之间的因果关系，这一研究有可能对安全政策界产生更广泛的影响。该研究将向决策者提出政策选择建议，并建议采取行动，通过向其他国家传达政府的偏好来加强国家安全。该项目将提供基本信息，说明哪类政策能有效地消除潜在对手的疑虑，以及在多大程度上有效。此外，这项研究的结果也将适用于社会心理学，经济学，商业和政治学等领域。从根本上说，该项目是关于两方或多方之间的意图沟通：参与者如何使他们的信号可信。这项研究将使学者们能够研究这种沟通的态度形成。这项研究将为这些学科提供关于我们如何使沟通更有效和更高效的经验教训。