EAGER: Collaborative: Toward a Test Bed for Heavy Vehicle Cyber Security Experimentation

卡车和公共汽车等重型车辆是美国关键基础设施的一部分，在商业和私营企业运营中占很大一部分。在这些资产的网络安全方面投入的努力很少。如果攻击者进入车辆的控制器区域网络（CAN），就可以发动攻击，影响关键的车辆电子元件。传统上，需要对重型车辆进行物理访问才能访问CAN。然而，重型车辆上也安装了无线设备，这使卡车和公共汽车容易受到远程无线网络攻击。本项目探讨了与CAN通信的无线设备相关的网络安全漏洞。对于已确定的威胁，研究人员确定适当的缓解策略，包括在何处以及如何部署它们。为了证明潜在的漏洞和后续对拟议缓解策略的信任，该项目设计并实现了一个可扩展的高保真测试平台，使用实际的重型车辆电子控制单元，如发动机和制动控制器。该试验台包括用于远程访问和安全信息传递的内置机制，以允许不同地点的研究人员之间进行协作。这项研究的结果，包括用其他组件扩展测试平台的潜力，可能会影响其他使用can的行业的网络安全分析，如楼宇自动化、医疗设备和制造业。SAE J1939重型车辆通信网络基于CAN，并有数据包定义和传输的开放文档。这种开放性可能被用来创建欺骗的J1939消息。重型车辆所有者利用第三方系统，例如远程远程信息处理，引入新的启用J1939的模块，这些模块可能被对手颠覆。本项目利用这些系统获得远程访问和攻击另一个CAN连接的电子控制单元。当远程信息处理系统无线连接到CAN以确定是否可以插入假数据包时，执行数据包嗅探。研究包括检查入侵检测系统的不同设计、配置和部署，以使用开发的测试平台最好地阻止此类远程攻击。其中一个挑战是开发能够与已部署的测试平台硬件实时操作的算法。研究包括制定科学策略，以测量测试平台中网络行动的时间响应和任何入侵检测系统的反应时间，以便根据在J1939网络上进行远程网络操作的能力确定边界。

Heavy vehicles, such as trucks and buses, are part of the US critical infrastructure and carry out a significant portion of commercial and private business operations. Little effort has been invested in cyber security for these assets. If an adversary gains access to the vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN), attacks can be launched that can affect critical vehicle electronic components. Traditionally, physical access to a heavy vehicle was required to access the CAN. However, wireless devices are also installed on heavy vehicles, which open trucks and busses to remote wireless cyber attacks. This project explores cyber security vulnerabilities related to wireless devices that communicate on the CAN. For identified threats, researchers determine the proper mitigation strategies, including where and how they are best deployed. To demonstrate potential exploits and subsequent trust in proposed mitigation strategies, this project designs and implements a scalable, high-fidelity test bed using actual heavy vehicle electronic control units, such as engine and brake controllers. The test bed includes built-in mechanisms for remote access and secure information delivery to allow for collaboration among researchers at different sites. The results of the research, including the potential to extend the test bed with other components, can impact cyber security analysis for other industries that use CAN, such as building automation, medical devices, and manufacturing. The SAE J1939 communication network in heavy vehicles is based on CAN and has open documentation for packet definition and transmission. This openness may be exploited for creating spoofed J1939 messages. Heavy vehicle owners utilize third-party systems, such as remote telematics, that introduce new J1939 enabled modules, which can potentially be subverted by an adversary. This project uses these systems to gain remote access and attack another CAN connected electronic control unit. Packet sniffing is performed as the telematics system connects wirelessly to the CAN to determine if fake packets can be inserted. Research includes examining different designs, configurations, and deployments of intrusion detection systems to best thwart such remote attacks using the developed test bed. One challenge is to develop algorithms that can act in real-time with deployed test bed hardware. Research includes developing scientific strategies to measure the temporal response of the cyber actions in the test bed and the reaction time of any intrusion detection system, so that bounds can be determined based on the ability to conduct a remote cyber operation on a J1939 network.