EAGER: Legal Barriers to Securing the Routing Architecture

IP地址可能被窃取或劫持。它可以立即发生，并可能导致Internet连接的丢失和/或流量转移到恶意实体。直到最近，一个组织无法证明其互联网地址的所有权。全球资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）是一个框架，旨在通过使第三方能够加密验证Internet地址块的所有权声明，并允许此类资源持有者声明路由关系，从而保护Internet路由基础设施。然而，由于法律因素，RPKI的采用仍然处于僵局。本项目支持对相关方（如网络运营商）使用RPKI的责任适当分配进行独立评估，这可以作为各方讨论解决中继方协议（RPA）中赔偿条款僵局的基础。如果这些讨论取得成功，这项研究最终将促进RPKI在北美的更广泛使用，并使互联网更加安全。BGP是一个遍布全球的实时分布式协议，在数百万台路由器上运行，连接6万个不同的管理域，称为自治系统（Autonomous Systems， AS），并为70万个目标网络提供路由信息。BGP最初是在一个不太关注安全性的时代设计的，主要的BGP路由变化是由运营商通过电子邮件或社区邮件列表进行沟通的。然而，互联网呈指数级增长，全球BGP路由系统的系统性漏洞在过去十年中一直是网络运营商关注的主题。RPKI为这个问题提供了一个解决方案。然而，采用RPKI来保护BGP路由的最大障碍之一是，大多数组织不会或不能签署ARIN的RPKI依赖协议。通过进行法律分析并促成一种新的协议和妥协形式，就可以在互联网基础设施的这一重要基础组成部分上取得进展。

IP addresses can be stolen or hijacked. It can happen instantly, and may result in a loss of Internet connectivity and/or diversion of traffic to a malicious entity. Until recently, an organization was unable to prove ownership of its Internet address. A global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a framework designed to secure the Internet's routing infrastructure by enabling Third parties to cryptographically validate claims of ownership of Internet address blocks and permit such resource holders to declare routing relationships. However, adoption of RPKI remains at an impasse largely due to legal factors. This project supports an independent assessment of the proper allocation of liability for uses of RPKI by related parties, such as network operators, that can serve as the basis for the parties to discuss resolving the impasse over the indemnification clauses in the Relaying Party Agreement (RPA). If those discussions are successful, the research will ultimately promote more widespread use of RPKI in North America and enable a more secure Internet.BGP is a live distributed protocol which spans the globe, operating on millions of routers, interconnecting 60,000 distinct administrative domains, called Autonomous Systems (AS), and providing routing information to 700,000 destination networks. BGP was originally designed in an era in which security was not a significant concern, and major BGP route changes were communicated by operators via email or community mailing lists. However, the Internet has grown exponentially and the systemic vulnerabilities of the global BGP routing system have been the subject of concern for network operators for the last decade. RPKI provides one solution to the problem. One of the largest obstacles to the adoption of RPKI to secure BGP routing, however, is the fact that most organizations will not or cannot sign ARIN's RPKI Relying Agreement. By conducting a legal analysis and enabling a new form of agreement and compromise, progress forward can be made on this important underlying component of the Internet infrastructure.