Planning IUCRC at The University of Arkansas: Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES)

今天的电力输送系统对国家及其公民的福利至关重要，这可能比任何其他关键基础设施都重要。所有其他系统，从农业、交通、制造业到电信，都依赖于安全、可靠的电力输送。系统故障（如1965年美国东北部的故障）、环境因素（如2003年美国东北部的故障）、物理攻击（如2013年加州北部的停电）或网络攻击（如2015年乌克兰的攻击），都导致了人类的痛苦和生产力的损失，这是这种相互依存的结果。能源系统基础设施可信度中心（CITES） IUCRC将通过提供以下能力，使我们的国家能够限制这些网络物理攻击对国家安全的影响：寻求防止此类攻击，快速检测确实发生的攻击，启用在此类攻击存在下继续运行的强大基础设施，并在攻击后快速恢复国家基础设施。从历史上看，随着控制能源输送系统（EDS）的系统变得越来越复杂，它们的组件变得越来越相互关联。最初用于封闭串行系统的系统暴露在敌对环境中，没有最先进的网络安全设计；通常，仅仅连接到这些服务就足以对它们所监督的流程施加完全的控制。虽然现代EDS设计充分意识到这些局限性，但经过大量的学术研究和行业基础设施投资，这些系统的遗留问题仍然存在。CITES寻求通过独特的学术和行业合作伙伴关系来解决这些遗留影响，旨在：(i)确保遗留系统和提供商继续从新兴的网络安全科学和其他领域的故障和改进中学习；（ii）解决关键EDS基础设施面临的独特威胁。这些双重目标需要紧密整合的研究和行业合作伙伴关系，不仅要解决目前存在的问题，还要确保我们国家EDS基础设施的持续可靠性。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Perhaps more than any other piece of critical infrastructure, today's power delivery systems are critical to the welfare of the country and its citizens. All other systems, from agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing to telecommunications are dependent on safe, reliable delivery of power. Faulty systems, as in the case of the northeastern US failures of 1965, environmental factors, as in the northeastern US failures of 2003, physical attacks, as in the 2013 northern California outages, or cyber attacks, as in the 2015 attacks in Ukraine, have all led to human suffering and loss of productivity as the result of this interdependence. The Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES) IUCRC will enable our nation to limit impact of these cyber-physical attacks on national security by providing capabilities that: seek to prevent such attacks, rapidly detect attacks that do occur, enable robust infrastructure that continues to operate in the presence of such attacks, and quickly restore the nation's infrastructure after attack.Historically, as the systems that controlled energy delivery systems (EDS) became more complex, their components became increasingly interconnected. Systems originally intended for closed, serial systems were exposed to adversarial environments without state-of-the-art designs for cybersecurity; merely connecting to such services was often enough to exert complete control over the processes they oversee. While the modern EDS designs are fully aware of these limitations, after substantial academic research and industry infrastructure investment, the legacy of such systems persists. CITES seeks to address these legacy implications through a unique academic and industry partnership aimed at: (i) ensuring that legacy systems and providers continue to learn from the nascent science of cybersecurity and failures and improvements in other domains; and (ii) addressing the unique nature of threats to the critical EDS infrastructure. These dual goals require tightly integrated research and industry partnerships to solve not only the problems as they exist today, but to insure the continued reliability of our nation's EDS infrastructure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.