The properties of mechanistic constitution

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Two important aims of the contemporary philosophy of neurobiology are (a) to develop a descriptively adequate structural model of neurobiological explanations and (b) to determine a general methodology for neurobiological theory building. The two aims are connected in the sense that any candidate model of the logical structure of neurobiological explanations should be combinable with a set of rules for the discovery and extension of the instances of the model. One proposal trying to meet these demands that currently enjoys much popularity is the ``mechanistic approach'' to neurobiology (cf. Machamer et al. 2000, Craver and Darden 2001, Craver 2002, 2007). According to this theory, neurobiological explanations essentially have a causal and a constitutional ingredient. The establishment of both aspects requires certain methodological principles, where causal reasoning is less problematic than the reasoning about constitutional structures. Concerning the latter, the methodological proposal favoured by the proponents of the mechanistic approach is based on a ``manipulationist'' definition of constitution, according to which a mechanism constitutes another one if, and only if, (1) the first is mereologically related to the second and (2) the two are ``mutually manipulable''. It has recently been argued that the manipulationist definition faces certain conceptual problems (cf., for instance, Leuridan 2012). As an alternative, Mark Couch and myself have independently proposed a regularity account of mechanistic constitution (Harbecke 2010, Couch 2011). This approach appears to be conceptually sound and descriptively adequate with respect to certain paradigm neurobiological explanations (aim (a)). In this project, my aim is threefold. First, (i) I want to understand better the formal properties of mechanistic constitution and (ii) to develop a cost/gains comparison of my regularity account with competing notions. I have already worked on the connection of mechanistic constitution and supervenience (cf. Harbecke 2013a) as well as on best-system problems within mechanistic theories (cf. Harbecke 2013b). However, my account still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the connection between mechanistic regularity constitution and other classical notions from the metaphysics of science and mind, such as realization, emergence, composition etc. The third aim (iii) concerns the development of an adequate general methodology of constitutional reasoning in neurobiology based on regularity constitution (aim (b)). The goal will be to develop general algorithms specified for the development of neurobiological explanations. The rules guided by the algorithms will bear a certain correspondence to Boolean approaches to causal inference discussed in connection to regularity theories of causation. However, the transformation will require important adjustments.