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Human Dignity and Minimal Subsistence: The Possibilities of Legitimation and Limitation of a Normative Minimal Standard

人的尊严和最低限度的生存：规范性最低限度标准的合法性和限制的可能性

基本信息

批准号：
282115157
负责人：
Dr. Jens Peter Brune
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Philosophie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/282115157?language=en
关键词：
Human Dignity Minimal Subsistence Possibilities

项目摘要

Of the many minimal standards that determine mutual behavioral expectations in different spheres of life, some are of the highest legal and moral relevance. In legal discourse a concept of human dignity that constitutes the inviolable 'core content' of fundamental rights - rights that are in other aspects legally restrictable - frequently comes into play. Analogically, a series of philosophical conceptions of ethics draw on the principle of human dignity in order to mark out a core of moral claims that demand particular regard within the moral sphere, such as human rights. Despite all the criticism regarding the idea of human dignity, in specific argumentation contexts human dignity is evidently given credit for a twofold normative function: on one hand this idea is intended to serve as a 'source' or legitimizing foundation for normative minimal standards; on the other hand it is also expected to restrict the type and scope of the concomitant claims in a rational manner. Many contributions to socio- and legal-political controversies, but also to bioethical ones, draw on this stratification function, at least implicitly. So far the moral-philosophical debate has been revolving primarily around the derivation or justification of basic rights using the principle of human dignity. The reverse problem, however, of limiting such rights becomes more urgent as 'human dignity' becomes more distinctly interpreted as grounding the rights of social participation. Even though this type of claims is still considered a second priority precisely because of their structural vagueness, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany opened a new path in 2010 and 2012 by constitutionally establishing a subjective right to a guaranteed humane minimal subsistence. The research project takes this development as an imputes to make clear the stratifying capability of the concept of human dignity in a comparative study of relevant current philosophical conceptions by using the example of humane minimal existence. At the same time, a general contribution is to be made to the understanding of the principle of human dignity in its established variants of interpretations, to uncover its implications, and to further the transparency of its ethical and legal application.

在决定不同生活领域相互行为期望的许多最低标准中，有些具有最高的法律的和道德相关性。在法律的论述中，构成基本权利-在其他方面可受法律限制的权利-不可侵犯的“核心内容”的人的尊严概念经常发挥作用。类似地，一系列伦理学哲学概念借鉴了人的尊严原则，以确定道德要求的核心，这些要求在道德领域内得到特别重视，如人权。尽管对人的尊严的概念提出了各种批评，但在具体的论证语境中，人的尊严显然被赋予了双重规范功能：一方面，这一概念旨在作为规范性最低标准的“来源”或合法化基础;另一方面，它也被期望以理性的方式限制伴随要求的类型和范围。许多对社会和法律政治争议的贡献，以及对生命伦理争议的贡献，至少是含蓄地借鉴了这种分层功能。到目前为止，道德哲学辩论主要围绕着如何利用人的尊严原则来推导或证明基本权利。然而，随着“人的尊严”被更明确地解释为社会参与权的基础，限制这种权利的反向问题变得更加紧迫。尽管这类诉求由于其结构上的复杂性仍被视为第二优先事项，但德国的联邦宪法法院在2010年和2012年开辟了一条新的道路，在宪法中确立了获得有保障的人道最低生活的主观权利。本研究以这一发展为切入点，通过对当代相关哲学概念的比较研究，以人类最低限度生存为例，阐明人的尊严概念的分层能力。与此同时，还将对理解人的尊严原则的各种既定解释作出一般性贡献，揭示其影响，并提高其在道德和法律的适用方面的透明度。