Transnational solidarity conflicts: constitutional courts as fora for and players in conflict resolution

国家在社会经济事务上的立法自主权越来越受到欧盟成员国之间政治和经济相互依赖以及欧洲层面监管的限制。在2008年开始的欧元区危机期间，这一点变得尤为突出。民族自治权的丧失，引发了围绕共同货币和不断推进的一体化所带来的不同调整成本的政治和法律冲突。这些冲突可以理解为跨国团结冲突。该项目的核心假设是：国家层面上有限的政治自主权和超国家层面上越来越多的分配制度的行政决策相结合，使那些受到这些超国家决策负面影响的群体面临政治包容的风险。然而，尽管具有跨国性质，欧盟内部的团结冲突越来越多地由国内宪法法院处理。这就解释了本项目的核心研究问题：国内宪法法院在确保TSC的政治包容方面发挥了什么样的经验作用？他们的角色如何被规范地证明？该项目的研究对象是欧元区五个援助国和债务国的宪法法院和最高法院的宪法学。这一法理学将在三个层面进行研究：(1)从经验上看，研究项目询问为什么国内宪法法院和最高法院成为解决TSC的关键论坛。该项目假设，这些法院成为政治和社会参与者的诱人论坛，正是因为涉及国内议会的政治战略由于相互依赖和欧盟监管造成的限制而不再富有成效。因此，国内法院似乎适合获得TSC的象征性承认。(2)在分析层面，本项目比较分析了宪法法院和最高法院在TSC中的积极作用。有两个问题值得进一步关注：法院是否使用程序法作为过滤器来影响他们对TSC的参与，如果是，如何使用？在TSC的国内宪法裁决中，哪些论证模式和理论概念是核心？这些模式如何塑造跨国团结的意义？(3)最后，该项目在规范层面上讨论了国内宪法法院和最高法院在TSC中的干预如何是合理的。其目标是制定一个理论上的标准来界定这些法院在TSC中的合法职能，同时考虑到以权力分立为基础的民主制度的要求。根据这一标准来衡量它们，可以对目前关于TSC的宪法裁决中使用的理论概念和辩论模式进行批判性评估。

National legislative autonomy in socio-economic matters is increasingly limited by political and economic interdependencies between EU member states and regulation at the European level. This has become particularly salient during the Eurozone crisis, which began in 2008. The loss of national autonomy has given rise to political and legal conflicts over the disparate adjustment cost resulting from a common currency and progressing integration. These conflicts can be grasped as transnational solidarity conflicts (TSC). The core hypothesis of this project is: The combination of limited political autonomy at the national level and increasingly executive decision-making on distributional regimes at the supranational level puts at risk the political inclusion of those groups who are negatively affected by those supranational decisions. Despite their transnational nature, however, solidarity conflicts in the EU are increasingly being dealt with by domestic constitutional courts. This explains the core research questions of this project: What role do domestic constitutional courts play empirically in securing political inclusion in TSC? How can their role be normatively justified?The research object of this project is the constitutional jurisprudence of five constitutional and apex courts in both donor and debtor countries in the Eurozone. This jurisprudence will be examined at three levels: (1) Empirically, the research project asks why domestic constitutional and apex courts become crucial fora for settling TSC. The project hypothesizes that these courts become tempting fora for political and social players precisely because a political strategy involving domestic parliaments is no longer fruitful due to the restraints resulting from interdependencies and EU regulation. Consequently, domestic courts appear suitable for obtaining symbolic recognition of TSC. (2) At an analytical level, the project then comparatively analyzes the active role of constitutional and apex courts in TSC. Two questions merit closer attention: Do courts use procedural law as a filter to influence their involvement in TSC and if so, how? Which argumentative patterns and doctrinal concepts are central in domestic constitutional adjudication of TSC and how do these patterns shape the meaning of transnational solidarity? (3) Finally, the project discusses at a normative level how the intervention of domestic constitutional and apex courts in TSC may be justified. The goal is to develop a theoretical yardstick to define the legitimate function of these courts in TSC, taking into account the requirements of a democratic system that is based on the separation of powers. Measuring them against this yardstick, a critical assessment of the doctrinal concepts and argumentative patterns used in current constitutional adjudication on TSC can be undertaken.