Transnational solidarity conflicts: constitutional courts as fora for and players in conflict resolution

跨国团结冲突：宪法法院作为解决冲突的论坛和参与者

• 批准号: 318864869
• 负责人: Professorin Dr. Anuscheh Farahat
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Independent Junior Research Groups
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2015-12-31 至 2023-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/318864869?language=en
• 关键词: Transnational; solidarity; conflicts; constitutional; courts

National legislative autonomy in socio-economic matters is increasingly limited by political and economic interdependencies between EU member states and regulation at the European level. This has become particularly salient during the Eurozone crisis, which began in 2008. The loss of national autonomy has given rise to political and legal conflicts over the disparate adjustment cost resulting from a common currency and progressing integration. These conflicts can be grasped as transnational solidarity conflicts (TSC). The core hypothesis of this project is: The combination of limited political autonomy at the national level and increasingly executive decision-making on distributional regimes at the supranational level puts at risk the political inclusion of those groups who are negatively affected by those supranational decisions. Despite their transnational nature, however, solidarity conflicts in the EU are increasingly being dealt with by domestic constitutional courts. This explains the core research questions of this project: What role do domestic constitutional courts play empirically in securing political inclusion in TSC? How can their role be normatively justified?The research object of this project is the constitutional jurisprudence of five constitutional and apex courts in both donor and debtor countries in the Eurozone. This jurisprudence will be examined at three levels: (1) Empirically, the research project asks why domestic constitutional and apex courts become crucial fora for settling TSC. The project hypothesizes that these courts become tempting fora for political and social players precisely because a political strategy involving domestic parliaments is no longer fruitful due to the restraints resulting from interdependencies and EU regulation. Consequently, domestic courts appear suitable for obtaining symbolic recognition of TSC. (2) At an analytical level, the project then comparatively analyzes the active role of constitutional and apex courts in TSC. Two questions merit closer attention: Do courts use procedural law as a filter to influence their involvement in TSC and if so, how? Which argumentative patterns and doctrinal concepts are central in domestic constitutional adjudication of TSC and how do these patterns shape the meaning of transnational solidarity? (3) Finally, the project discusses at a normative level how the intervention of domestic constitutional and apex courts in TSC may be justified. The goal is to develop a theoretical yardstick to define the legitimate function of these courts in TSC, taking into account the requirements of a democratic system that is based on the separation of powers. Measuring them against this yardstick, a critical assessment of the doctrinal concepts and argumentative patterns used in current constitutional adjudication on TSC can be undertaken.

国家在社会经济事务上的立法自主权越来越受到欧盟成员国之间政治和经济相互依存关系以及欧洲层面监管的限制。这一点在2008年开始的欧元区危机期间尤为突出。国家自主权的丧失引起了政治和法律的冲突，因为共同货币和一体化进程造成了不同的调整成本。这些冲突可以被理解为跨国团结冲突（TSC）。这个项目的核心假设是：在国家一级的有限的政治自治和越来越多的行政决策的分配制度在超国家一级的结合，使那些群体的政治包容性的风险，这些超国家的决定产生负面影响。然而，尽管具有跨国性质，欧盟内部的团结冲突越来越多地由国内宪法法院处理。这就解释了本项目的核心研究问题：国内宪法法院在确保TSC的政治包容性方面发挥了什么样的作用？如何从规范上证明其作用是合理的？该项目的研究对象是欧元区捐助国和债务国五个宪法法院和最高法院的宪法判例。本研究将从三个层面探讨这一判例：（1）从经验上讲，本研究项目探讨了为什么国内宪法法院和最高法院成为解决海训问题的关键论坛。该项目假设，这些法院成为政治和社会参与者的诱人论坛，正是因为涉及国内议会的政治战略不再富有成效，由于相互依存和欧盟监管的限制。因此，国内法院似乎适合获得对海训方案的象征性承认。(2)在分析层面上，该项目比较分析宪法法院和最高法院在海训方案中的积极作用。有两个问题值得密切关注：法院是否利用程序法作为过滤器来影响它们参与海训方案，如果是，如何影响？在国内的宪法裁决中，哪些论证模式和理论概念是核心，这些模式如何塑造跨国团结的含义？(3)最后，该项目在规范层面讨论了如何证明国内宪法法院和最高法院对海训方案的干预是合理的。目标是制定一个理论标准，以界定这些法院在海训方案中的合法职能，同时考虑到以权力分立为基础的民主制度的要求。衡量他们对这一尺度，一个关键的评估理论的概念和论证模式，在当前的宪法裁决中使用的TSC可以进行。