Dynamic Information Revelation

本课题的目的是研究价格在传递卖方所拥有的私人信息中的作用。我将分析卖家拥有关于其商品的私人信息的市场，例如房地产市场或某些金融资产市场。在这样的市场中，卖家会在一段时间内设定商品的价格，直到某个买家接受这个价格。卖方可以使用他们的价格选择来传递关于他们的私人信息的信息，因此买方可以根据观察到的价格来决定。我的研究将集中在开发一个理论模型，以研究卖方如何选择价格来传递或隐藏有关其产品的信息，以及这种信息传递是如何由市场特征塑造的。因此，我希望获得经济见解，了解如何以最佳方式监管市场，以尽量减少信息不对称的负面影响，正如一些市场在最近的金融危机中所经历的那样，可能会减缓甚至冻结贸易。

The goal of this project is to investigate the role of prices in transmitting private information possessed by sellers. I will analyze markets where sellers possess private information about their goods such as, for example, the housing market or markets for some financial assets. In such markets, sellers set the price of their goods over time until the price is accepted by some buyer. The sellers may use their price choice to transmit information about their private information, and therefore the buyers may condition their decisions on the observed prices. My investigation will focus on developing a theoretical model to investigate how sellers choose the price to transmit or hide information about their products, and how such information transmission is shaped by the characteristics of the market. As a result, I expect to gain economic insights into how to optimally regulate markets to minimize the negative effects of the information asymmetries that, as some markets experienced in the recent financial crisis, may slow down or even freeze trade.