Conglomerate Mergers

企业集团合并

• 批准号: 20J13138
• 负责人: HerreraVelasquez Jose de Jesus
• 金额: $ 0.7万
• 依托单位: Kyoto University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2020-04-24 至 2022-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-20J13138/
• 关键词: Adverse Selection; Contract Mechanism; Multimarket Competition; Stackelberg Oligopoly; Production Constraint; Conglomerate Mergers; Antitrust; Diversification; Game Theory; Resources

The paper "Agency problems in a competitive conglomerate with production constraints" was completed. The study develops an adverse selection model of a competing conglomerate with production constraints. It fully characterize the first and the second-best contracts. When the production constraints make the first best outcome unattainable, the second-best contract is either separating or pooling.The paper "Conglomerate merger and divestment dynamics" was completed. It employs a discrete-time, infinite horizon theoretical model to analyze the diversifying and divesting behavior of a monopolist. The conglomerate acquires a firm and stays merged in periods where the value of the demand of the new market remains high. Otherwise, the conglomerate will merge and divest intermittently.

完成了题为“在生产受到限制的竞争性联合企业中的代理问题”的文件。建立了一个具有生产约束的竞争企业集团逆向选择模型。它充分刻画了第一和第二最好的合同。当生产约束使得第一最佳结果无法实现时，第二最佳契约是分离或联营。它采用离散时间，无限时域的理论模型来分析垄断企业的多元化和剥离行为。在新市场的需求价值仍然很高的时期，企业集团收购一家公司并保持合并。 否则，企业集团将间歇性地进行合并和剥离。

项目成果

Conglomerate Mergers and Competition: A Game Theoretic Approach With Research And Development Investments

联合企业合并与竞争：研究与开发投资的博弈论方法

• 发表时间: 2021
• 作者: 飯島大智;村上正志;Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez
• 通讯作者: Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez

Agency Problems in A Competitive Conglomerate with Production Constraints

生产受限的竞争性企业集团中的代理问题

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: KIER Discussion Paper
• 作者: 乳原彩香・伊藤一樹・松田有史・角幸頼・松尾雅博・宮本都和・角谷寛;Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez
• 通讯作者: Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez

Allocating Investments in Conglomerate Mergers: A Game Theoretic Approach

联合企业合并中的投资分配：博弈论方法

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: KIER Discussion Paper
• 作者: Ayaka Ubara;Isa Okajima;Naho Machida;Hiroshi Kadotani;& Shin-ichi Ishikawa;Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez
• 通讯作者: Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez