Experimental Legal Philosophy: The Concept of Law Revisited

实验法哲学：重新审视法律概念

• 批准号: 434400506
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Stefan Magen
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/434400506?language=en
• 关键词: Experimental; Legal; Philosophy; Concept; Law

The research project aims to introduce experimental philosophy into legal philosophy. Experimental philosophy is, first of all, a methodological approach in philosophy, employing experimental methods developed in the psychological and cognitive sciences for the investigation of philosophical questions and theories. Mostly, experimental philosophy studies rational ‘intuitions’ that feature in philosophical armchair reasoning, in particular, intuitions on philosophical issues elicited in thought experiments. In this context, experiments are employed to explore the content of rational ‘intuitions’ (so-called ‘positive project’) as well as to test their epistemological reliability (so-called ‘negative project’). A third, methodologically naturalist strand of experimental philosophy directly studies mental states and processes of interest in philosophical reasoning. The experimental approach has yet been explored in a range of diverse philosophical areas but is widely absent in legal philosophy. The proposed project aims to remedy this omission and to provide a new perspective on the philosophy of law by exploring central issues of it from an experimental philosophy perspective. We will begin with a stage dedicated to theorizing about promising issues and approaches in legal philosophy with regard to their amenability to experimental investigations, and we will develop adequate experimental paradigms. We will then apply these paradigms to three successive experimental projects: The first set of experiments will explore these paradigms as applied to the classic dispute between legal positivism and natural law, with an emphasis on the rational ‘intuitions’ involved. The second set of experiments will then probe the impact of moral-psychological mechanisms on legal cognition, drawing on two central paradigms in moral psychology (moral foundations theory and moral dyad theory). Such influences will finally be explored on a more concrete level in the third set of experiments, addressing whether moral psychological findings about the moralization of physical harm can be applied to the phenomenon of immaterial harm widespread in legal cognition (e.g., with regard to freedom of expression or antidiscrimination). The most relevant findings will be explored cross-culturally.

该研究项目旨在将实验哲学引入法哲学。实验哲学首先是哲学中的一种方法论途径，采用心理学和认知科学中发展起来的实验方法来研究哲学问题和理论。大多数情况下，实验哲学研究以哲学扶手椅推理为特征的理性“直觉”，特别是思想实验中引发的对哲学问题的直觉。在这种背景下，实验被用来探索理性“直觉”的内容（所谓的“积极项目”），并检验其认识论的可靠性（所谓的“消极项目”）。实验哲学的第三种方法论自然主义流派直接研究哲学推理中感兴趣的心理状态和过程。实验方法已在一系列不同的哲学领域得到探索，但在法哲学中广泛缺乏。拟议的项目旨在弥补这一遗漏，并通过从实验哲学的角度探讨法哲学的核心问题，为法哲学提供新的视角。我们将从一个阶段开始，致力于对法哲学中有希望的问题和方法进行理论化，以使其适合实验研究，并且我们将开发适当的实验范式。然后，我们将把这些范式应用到三个连续的实验项目中：第一组实验将探索这些范式应用于法律实证主义和自然法之间的经典争论，重点是所涉及的理性“直觉”。第二组实验将利用道德心理学的两个中心范式（道德基础理论和道德二元理论）探讨道德心理机制对法律认知的影响。这些影响最终将在第三组实验中在更具体的层面上进行探讨，解决关于身体伤害道德化的道德心理学发现是否可以应用于法律认知中普遍存在的非物质伤害现象（例如，关于言论自由或反歧视）。最相关的发现将进行跨文化探索。