Opinion Dynamics with Rational Agents

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Dynamic opinion formation is an important aspect of modern societies. In the age of internet platforms and social media, opinion dynamics have had significant impact on societal and political issues. In this context, the amount of information available to the agents crucially influences the dynamics of opinion formation. Opinion dynamics are a current area of interest in algorithmic game theory. In this project, we are interested in a number of important algorithmic problems in the context of standard opinion formation models. In the second phase of the project, we study questions arising from the restriction of available information and erratic behavior of agents, the influence of lacking coordination and asynchronous dynamics, as well as opinion formation in dynamic environments. In addition, we are interested in the impact of information design, i.e., strategic signaling by information providers. Our main goals are to characterize existence and structure of (meta-)stable states, as well as to derive provable bounds on convergence times for dynamics. Moreover, we will analyze approximation algorithms for information design, and prove corresponding hardness of approximation results.