Collective Agency of Horizontal Regulatory Organizations in Global Environmental and Financial Market Governance

全球环境与金融市场治理横向监管组织集体机构

• 批准号: 443226341
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Thomas Gehring
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Arbeitsstelle Internationale Politische Ökonomie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/443226341?language=en
• 关键词: Collective; Agency; Horizontal; Regulatory; Organizations

The project will elaborate theoretically and investigate empirically whether and how horizontal regulatory organizations in two important areas of global politics – environmental protection and financial market regulation – gain collective agency along the dimensions of decision-making authority and autonomy. We will theorize mechanisms of autonomy-generation and authority acquisition and subject them to an empirical test in a mixed methods design. Both policy fields are characterized by the presence of numerous specialized, international or transnational governance institutions, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and its Paris Agreement, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). These institutions are authorized to produce and administer rules, but, in contrast to full-fledged international organizations, lack powerful bureaucracies and are dominated by their members. In line with James Coleman’s resource-based theory of corporate action, we argue that these horizontal organizations become actors in their own right like any other organization and can acquire autonomy (a specific organizational rationale), despite close control by their members. The project has three objectives: First, we will develop theoretical mechanisms showing how, and under which conditions, even strategically acting members of horizontal organizations can be expected to be enmeshed in institutional processes that generate organizational autonomy or decision-making authority. Related hypotheses will reflect general patterns of emerging agency of horizontal organizations. Second, we will compile a database of institutional characteristics and quantitatively examine patterns of resource endowment and autonomy and their development over time for a set of 40 horizontal organizations from the two policy fields. Third, in selected case studies we will examine whether and how the developed mechanisms translate into actual organizational autonomy.

该项目将从理论上阐述并实证考察全球政治的两个重要领域--环境保护和金融市场监管--的横向监管组织是否以及如何在决策权和自治权维度上获得集体代理。我们将对自治产生和权威获得的机制进行理论化，并在混合方法设计中对它们进行实证测试。这两个政策领域都有许多专门的、国际的或跨国的治理机构，包括《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《巴黎协定》、巴塞尔银行监管委员会和国际会计准则理事会。这些机构有权制定和管理规则，但与成熟的国际组织不同，它们缺乏强大的官僚机构，由其成员主导。根据詹姆斯·科尔曼的基于资源的企业行动理论，我们认为，这些横向组织像任何其他组织一样，凭借自己的权利成为行为者，并能够获得自治权(这是一种特定的组织原理)，尽管它们的成员密切控制着它们。该项目有三个目标：第一，我们将制定理论机制，说明如何以及在哪些条件下，即使是横向组织的战略行动成员，也可以期望参与产生组织自主权或决策权的体制进程。相关假说将反映横向组织出现代理的一般模式。第二，我们将编制一个机构特征数据库，对这两个政策领域的一组40个横向组织的资源禀赋和自主权模式及其随时间的发展进行量化审查。第三，在选定的案例研究中，我们将审查已开发的机制是否以及如何转化为实际的组织自治。