Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions

本文研究了组合拍卖中一个新的单调性问题--商品收益单调性，即拍卖人不能通过从捐赠品中丢弃商品而获得更多的收益，虽然没有一种机制同时满足商品收益单调性和其他期望性质，但我们找到了一个约束域，在该约束域中存在一个满足上述三个条件的商品收益单调机制.当积极投标者的数量足够大时，这一限制可能会得到满足。这表明，政府在拍卖公共物品时，必须消除所有进入壁垒，并邀请投标。

We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments.Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with other desirable properties, we find a restricted domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when the number of active bidders is sufficiently large.This suggests that it is important that governments eliminate all barriers to entry and invite bids when they auction their public goods.