Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions

我们研究了组合拍卖中一个新的单调性问题，称为商品收益单调性，它要求拍卖人从捐赠中丢弃商品而不再获得更多的收益，虽然没有任何机制同时满足商品收益单调性和其他期望性质，但我们发现了一个限制域，其中存在满足上述三个条件的商品收益单调性机制。当活跃竞标者的数量足够多时，这一限制可能会得到满足。这表明，各国政府在拍卖其公共产品时消除所有进入壁垒并进行招标是很重要的。

We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments.Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with other desirable properties, we find a restricted domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when the number of active bidders is sufficiently large.This suggests that it is important that governments eliminate all barriers to entry and invite bids when they auction their public goods.