Lobbying Across Multiple Levels: German Federal Institutions, European Union, and the Länder

拟议的研究项目调查了有组织的利益集团如何在不同级别的多层次系统中协调其政治活动。调查商业利益集团、代表分散利益的协会和公司的立法游说活动，这些有组织的利益被概念化为理性行为者。运用研究股共有的领域框架，我们考虑了两条主要路线之外的宣传路线--国家路线和布鲁塞尔路线--即使重点是国家政策制定者对其具有法律管辖权的立法。根据资源依赖和交流理论观点，我们确定了在冲突背景下的其他路线，这些路线将位于国家一级，除非和直到一个或多个行为者成功地将这一冲突转向欧盟或国家以下各级。如果利益集团未能克服针对其偏好的国家动员偏见，它可以将冲突扩大到例如欧盟层面，以弥补国家对其需求缺乏反应。一旦一项欧盟立法回到国家舞台，其内容可能会与国家政府所支持的有所不同。在这种情况下，利益集团寻求首先通过布鲁塞尔路线在国家一级执行其议程和/或规避冲突，目的是在立法到达国家调换或实施过程之前影响其实质。在实证方面，我们将分析研究单位共同提出的50项立法建议中的一个子样本。分析的主要单位是德国多层级政体背景下的利益组织。这些案例将根据政策范围及其在三级政府中的影响范围而有所不同，以确定利益集团何时、何地和如何活跃。经验分析包括两个主要部分：(A)确定和衡量研究单位一套立法提案中的一个小样本在这些级别上的群体行为(与P1合作)，以及(B)关于利益集团在驾驭多层级系统时作出的战略选择的三个详细案例研究。这些发现将有助于对联邦系统中的地方游说和游说的研究、关于欧洲多层次体系中的游说的文献以及关于场地选择和竞技场进入的研究。

The proposed research project investigates how organized interests coordinate their political activities across different levels of multilevel systems. Investigating legislative lobbying by business interest groups, associations representing diffuse interests, and firms, these organized interests are conceptualized as rational actors. Applying the arena framework common to the research unit, we consider routes of advocacy beyond the two principal routes – the national and the Brussels route – even when the focus is on legislation over which national policymakers have legal jurisdiction. Based on resource dependence and exchange theoretical perspectives, we identify additional routes in the context of conflicts that would be located at the national level unless and until one or more actors succeed in re-routing this conflict to the EU or subnational arena. If an interest group fails to overcome a national mobilization bias against its preferences, it can expand the conflict to, e.g., the EU level to compensate for the lack of national responsiveness to its needs. Once a piece of EU legislation returns to the national arena, its content likely differs from what the national government would have favored. Under these circumstances, interest groups seek to carry their agendas and/or circumvent conflict at the national level via the Brussels route first, aiming to influence its substance before the legislation reaches the national transposition or implementation process. Empirically, we will analyze a subsample of the 50 legislative proposals common to the research unit. The main unit of analysis is the interest organization in the context of the German multilevel system of government. The cases will vary with respect to policy area and their reach across the three levels of government to identify when, where, and how interest groups become active. The empirical analysis consists of two major components: (a) the identification and measurement of group behavior across these levels for a subsample of the research unit’s set of legislative proposals (in cooperation with P1), and (b) three detailed case studies on the strategic choices made by interest groups in navigating the multilevel system. The findings will contribute deeper insights to research on subnational lobbying and lobbying in federal systems, the literature on lobbying in the multilevel system of Europe, and research on venue choice and arena entry.