Experimental Study about the Effects of Different Accounting Information on over Stock pricing

本研究的主要目的是找出有效市场假说在证券市场中得以实现的条件。找到这种条件的第一个实验是测试市场是否可以在定价过程中反映有关证券的不同信息。具体来说，在第一个实验中，我们在实验室市场中有8个交易员，他们都持有相同的证券信息。8个中的4个有另一个信息另外4个也有另一个不同的信息。他们交易安全。最终均衡价格反映了所有8种价格的信息。这个定价过程不是很有效。第二个实验是找到我们可以认为市场是有效的具体条件。我们将交易者的决策机制固定为一个简单的模型，通常被称为“零智能”交易者。在由零智能交易者主导的市场中，我们可以得到均衡价格接近真实价格的结果。零智能交易者的存在可能是其中一个条件。第三个实验是将常识添加到第一个实验中。众所周知，真正的信息掌握在市场中的某个人手中。每个交易者都仔细观察定价过程，因为他们认为这是真实的信息。所以真正的均衡价格方法明显优于没有常识背景下的真正均衡。基于实验结果，我们可以对安全监管的政策制定者提出一些建议。发达国家的证券监管机构必须绝对保密地向交易者独家披露会计信息。否则，真实均衡价格就会偏离真实均衡价格。

The main purpose of this research is to find the conditions on which the efficient market hypothesis is realized in securities markets. First experiment to find such a condition is to test if markets can reflect different information concerning a security in a pricing process. Concretely in the first experiment we have eight traders in laboratory market and all of them hold one same information concerning a security. And four of eight have another information and other four also have another different information. They trade security. The final equilibrium price reflects information which all of eight have. This pricing process is not so efficient.The second experiment is to find concrete conditions which we can see market as efficient. We fixed the traders' decision making mechanism to a simple model usually called as "zero-intelligent" traders. And we can obtain the results that the equilibrium prices approach to the real true price in markets dominated by zero-intelligent traders. The existence of zero-intelligent traders might be one of the conditions.The third experiment is to add the common knowledge to the first experiment. The common knowledge is that the true information is held by someone in the markets. Every trader watch carefully pricing process because they suppose the true information. So the real equilibrium price approach to true equilibrium significantly better than no common knowledge context.We can propose some words to policy makers of security regulation based on the experimental results. Security regulation agencies of developed countries must exclusively disclose accounting information with absolute confidence to traders. If not so, real equilibrium price would be deviated from the real true equilibrium prices.