Experimental Study about the Effects of Different Accounting Information on over Stock pricing

本研究的主要目的是寻找有效市场假说在证券市场中实现的条件。发现这种情况的第一个实验是测试市场是否能在定价过程中反映与证券有关的不同信息。具体地说，在第一个实验中，我们在实验室市场上有八个交易者，他们都持有关于一种证券的相同信息。八分之四的人有另一种信息，另外四人也有另一种不同的信息。他们交换安全保障。最终的均衡价格反映了所有八个国家都拥有的信息。这种定价过程并不那么有效。第二个实验是寻找我们可以认为市场有效的具体条件。我们将交易者的决策机制固定为一个简单的模型，通常被称为“零智能”交易者。结果表明，在零智力交易者主导的市场中，均衡价格更接近真实价格。零智能交易者的存在可能是条件之一。第三个实验是在第一个实验的基础上增加常识。众所周知，真正的信息是由市场中的某个人持有的。每个交易员都仔细观察定价过程，因为他们假设的是真实信息。因此，真正的均衡价格方法比没有常识的情况下的真正均衡要好得多。我们可以根据实验结果对证券监管的政策制定者提出一些建议。发达国家的证券监管机构必须以绝对保密的方式向交易者独家披露会计信息。否则，实际均衡价格就会偏离真正的真实均衡价格。

The main purpose of this research is to find the conditions on which the efficient market hypothesis is realized in securities markets. First experiment to find such a condition is to test if markets can reflect different information concerning a security in a pricing process. Concretely in the first experiment we have eight traders in laboratory market and all of them hold one same information concerning a security. And four of eight have another information and other four also have another different information. They trade security. The final equilibrium price reflects information which all of eight have. This pricing process is not so efficient.The second experiment is to find concrete conditions which we can see market as efficient. We fixed the traders' decision making mechanism to a simple model usually called as "zero-intelligent" traders. And we can obtain the results that the equilibrium prices approach to the real true price in markets dominated by zero-intelligent traders. The existence of zero-intelligent traders might be one of the conditions.The third experiment is to add the common knowledge to the first experiment. The common knowledge is that the true information is held by someone in the markets. Every trader watch carefully pricing process because they suppose the true information. So the real equilibrium price approach to true equilibrium significantly better than no common knowledge context.We can propose some words to policy makers of security regulation based on the experimental results. Security regulation agencies of developed countries must exclusively disclose accounting information with absolute confidence to traders. If not so, real equilibrium price would be deviated from the real true equilibrium prices.