An Economic Analysis of Unauthorized Copying on the Internet

1)我们考虑了最简单的DRM，它允许免费或不允许复制，但关于消费者类型的信息不完整。我们首先在一般情况下得到了关于消费者可分离性的结果，并证明了存在临界类型的消费者。较高的实用程序类型选择自由复制菜单，而较低的实用程序类型选择不复制。在两类模型中，我们指出生产者的最优定价不同于两部制关税下的最优定价。这种价格策略带来更大的利润和社会福利，如果而且只有当自己的生产比制作人更有效率时。2)虽然制作人试图保护他们的内容不受互联网上的版权侵犯，但这并不容易，就像防止非法停车一样。对于这种情况，他们不仅必须考虑版权保护，还必须考虑这种未经授权的文件共享对交易成本的影响。我们考虑版权控制是否有效，以减少对生产者利润的损害，并增加社会福利。由于复制控制使得复制在物理上是不可能的，因此与没有复制控制相比，它降低了消费者的利益。我们发现，未经授权的文件共享的交易成本决定了复制控制的有效性，并从社会角度得到了生产者引入复制控制的激励同时与激励相容的条件。

1)We considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self production is more efficient than that of a producer.2)Although producers seek to protect their content from copyright infringement on the Internet, it is not easy, being similar to preventing illegal parking. For such a situation, they must not only consider copyright protection, but also the effect on transaction costs from such unauthorized file-sharing. We consider whether copy control is effective in order to reduce damages to the producer's profits and to increase social welfare. Since copy control makes copying physically impossible, it decreases consumer benefits, compared with those from no copy control. We show that transaction costs of unauthorized file-sharing determine the effectiveness of copy control and obtain the conditions under which there is an incentive for a producer to introduce copy control while being compatible with an incentive from a social perspective.