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An Economic Analysis of Unauthorized Copying on the Internet

互联网上未经授权复制的经济分析

基本信息

批准号：
16530164
负责人：
DOMON Koji
金额：
$ 0.64万
依托单位：
Waseda University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2004
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2004 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16530164/
关键词：
Copyright Unauthorized Copying Applied Microeconomics

项目摘要

1)We considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self production is more efficient than that of a producer.2)Although producers seek to protect their content from copyright infringement on the Internet, it is not easy, being similar to preventing illegal parking. For such a situation, they must not only consider copyright protection, but also the effect on transaction costs from such unauthorized file-sharing. We consider whether copy control is effective in order to reduce damages to the producer's profits and to increase social welfare. Since copy control makes copying physically impossible, it decreases consumer benefits, compared with those from no copy control. We show that transaction costs of unauthorized file-sharing determine the effectiveness of copy control and obtain the conditions under which there is an incentive for a producer to introduce copy control while being compatible with an incentive from a social perspective.

1）我们考虑最简单的DRM，它允许免费或不允许复制，关于消费者类型的信息不完整。我们首先得到了一般情况下消费者可分性的结果，并证明了存在一种临界消费者类型。一个高效用类型选择一个自由复制的菜单，而一个低效用类型选择不复制。在两种类型的模型中，我们指出，生产者的最优定价是不同的两部分关税。这种价格策略带来更大的利润和社会福利，当且仅当，自我生产比生产者更有效率。2）虽然生产者寻求保护他们的内容免受互联网上的版权侵犯，但这并不容易，类似于防止非法停车。对于这种情况，他们不仅要考虑版权保护，还要考虑这种未经授权的文件共享对交易成本的影响。我们考虑复制控制是否有效，以减少损害生产者的利润和增加社会福利。由于复制控制使复制物理上不可能，它减少了消费者的利益，与那些没有复制控制。我们发现，未经授权的文件共享的交易成本决定了复制控制的有效性，并获得的条件下，有一个激励生产者引入复制控制，同时从社会的角度来看，是兼容的激励。