Dividend Policies in the Banking Industry and the Effectiveness of Shareholder Governance

我们证实了银行在泡沫发生和泡沫破裂的时期，仍然保持了稳定的股利政策。我们还发现，银行业的股利支付受信贷增长的影响比利润更大。另一方面，股利支付与信贷增长的相关性不如职工收入与信贷增长的相关性强。这表明股东很难成为剩余利润的索取者。在金融危机时期，股利支付增长率与不良贷款增长率正相关。这些证据表明，从股东到银行管理层的治理权力的有效性是有限的。

We confirmed that banks had kept a stable dividend policy even in the period of the occurence and the burst of bubble. We also find the dividend payments in the banking industry are influenced by credit growth stronger than by profits. On the other hand, the correlation between dividend payments and credit growth are not as strong as that between employees' income and credit growth. It indicates shareholders are hardly the residual profit claimers. In the period of financial crisis, the growth rate of dividend payments positively correlated with the growth rate of nonperforming loan. These evidence suggests that the effectiveness of governmance power from shareholder to bank managements is limited.