Competent Believers. Towards a New Virtue Epistemology

有能力的信徒。

• 批准号: 498800272
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Erasmus Mayr, since 11/2023
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/498800272?language=en
• 关键词: Competent; Believers.; Towards; New; Virtue

What is it to be a rational believer? On a widely held view, a rational believer is someone who forms their beliefs by correctly responding to their epistemic reasons, such as their evidence for or against some proposition. But what is to correctly respond to one’s epistemic reasons? The overarching aim of my project is to develop and defend a novel answer to this question: correctly responding to one’s epistemic reasons is a matter of exercising one’s epistemic virtue. A rational believer is thus an epistemically virtuous believer. The answer is novel because it’s based on a novel account of epistemic virtue. The currently dominant forms of virtue epistemology conceive of epistemic virtue either as a kind of skill (athletic skills being the favorite model) or as a species of moral virtue. But neither conception of epistemic virtue delivers a satisfactory account of correctly responding to one’s epistemic reasons. By contrast, on the account I aim to develop, epistemic virtue is indeed a distinctive kind of human excellence: it’s a virtue—not a skill—and it’s distinctively epistemic—not simply a species of moral virtue. My hope is that developing this alternative form of virtue epistemology will offer, not just an adequate account of epistemic reasons-responsiveness, but also a fresh perspective on a number of important issues at the intersection of epistemology and ethics (such as epistemic injustice or the relation between epistemic and moral virtuousness).

什么是理性的信徒？在一个广泛接受的观点，一个理性的信徒是谁形成他们的信念，正确地回应他们的认识的原因，如他们的证据支持或反对一些命题。但是，什么才是正确地回应一个人的认识理性呢？我的项目的首要目标是发展和捍卫这个问题的一个新颖的答案：正确地回应一个人的认识原因是一个问题的行使一个人的认识美德。一个理性的信徒因此是一个认识上有道德的信徒。答案是新颖的，因为它是基于一个新的认识美德的帐户。目前占主导地位的美德认识论认为，认识性美德要么是一种技能（运动技能是最受欢迎的模型），要么是一种道德美德。但无论是认识美德的概念提供了一个令人满意的帐户正确回应一个人的认识的原因。相比之下，基于我想要发展的理由，认知美德确实是一种独特的人类美德：它是一种美德而不是一种技能，它是独特的认知美德而不仅仅是一种道德美德。我的希望是，发展这种替代形式的美德认识论将提供，不仅是一个认识的原因，反应性充分的帐户，但也有一个新的角度对一些重要的问题，在认识论和伦理学的交叉点（如认识的不公正或认识和道德美德之间的关系）。