A study on the establishment of the experimental natural science and the modern epistemology in the late seventeenth century England

关于这一研究项目，已经发表了六篇论文。所有这些都被转载在研究报告中。在第一篇论文《洛克的自然科学哲学》中，我指出，现代认识论的刻板印象，即从内部表征到外部世界，未能正确把握洛克的哲学立场。他的立场只能用关于具体和普遍的逻辑语言图式来理解。第二篇论文《经验主义知识的建立--给定的、效用的、社会的》明确指出，经验主义知识主张的依据不仅是感官数据，而且是知识的效用以及对熟练专业人员知识主张的权威认可。在第三篇论文《体验中的个体--自然主义与感觉数据理论批判》中，我认为今天的自然主义与经典经验主义有一些相似之处，所谓的感觉数据理论并不正确地代表了真正的经验主义哲学。在第四篇论文《哲学家对实验自然科学的本质一无所知有多长时间了？》中，我指出，刻板的“内外”认识论模式剥夺了哲学家对自然科学中的实验和观察的真正理解。在1997年于加利福尼亚州蒙特利举行的第24届休谟会议上发表的第五篇论文《现代人的概念与休谟的人格认同》中，我提出了休谟对人格认同概念的分析方法可视为当今知识社会学和社会人类学的一个原型。第六篇论文《笛卡尔与英国经验主义》描述了罗伯特·博伊尔和约翰·洛克等经验主义者与笛卡尔的区别。

On this research projects, six papers have been published. All of them are reprinted in the research report. In the first paper, 'John Locke's philosophy of natural science', I point out that the stereotyped scheme of the modern epistemology, i.e.from the inner representations to the outer world, fails to grasp Locke's philosophical stance correctly. His stance can be understood only with the logico-linguistic scheme about the particulars and the universals. The second paper, 'The establishment of empirical knowledge --the given, the utility, the society', makes it clear that the grounds of empiricist knowledge claims are not only the sense-data but also the utility of knowledge and the authoritative endorsement of knowledge claims made by skilled professionals. In the third paper, 'An individual in experiencing --naturalism and the criticisms of sense-data theory', I maintain that naturalism today has some similarity to the classical empiricism and that so-called sense-data theory does not correctly represent the genuine empiricist philosophy. In the fourth paper, 'How long have philosophers been ignorant of the essence of experimental natural science? ', I point out that the stereotyped "inner-outer" scheme of epistemology has deprived philosophers of the access to a true understanding of experiments and observations in natural science. In the fifth paper, 'The Modern Concept of Man and Hume on Personal Identity', presented at the 24th Hume Conference at Monterey, California, 1997, I put forward a view that Hume's method of analysis of the concept of personal identity can be regarded an archetype of the sociology of knowledge and the social anthropology today. The sixth paper, 'Descartes and the British empiricism', describes the traits which differentiate empiricists, such as Robert Boyle and John Locke, from Cartesians.