Common Knowledge : A Critical Examination

1.从认识论的角度批判了博弈论对常识的研究。我们发现，巴肯公理(或单调性要求)是标准分析的关键要求，从有限理性的角度来看，它存在一些问题。我们提出了一个废除它的研究计划(“简化论”)。我们尝试根据程序进行分析，发现我们可以在没有巴肯公理的情况下刻画纳什均衡。我们从几个角度对研究计划本身进行了批评。我们发现，它的一个边界在于它使用了理性人假设，即它基于冯·诺伊曼-摩根斯坦(1947)意义上的所有参与者都是“理性”的假设。我们指出，大卫·刘易斯在1969年的《惯例：哲学分析》中对常识的第一次分析没有使用它，从有限理性的角度来看，它具有一定的意义。

1. We criticized the game-theoretic study on common knowledge from the epistemological point of view.2. We found that the Barcan axiom (or the requirement of monotonicity) is the key requirement of the standard analysis and has some problems from the viewpoint of bounded rationality. We proposed a research program ("reductionism") that dispenses with it.3. We attempted the analysis according to the program and found that we can characterize the Nash equilibrium without the Barcan axiom.4. We criticized the research program itself from several points of view. We found that a boundary of it is in the fact that it uses the rational man hypothesis, that is, it is based on the assumption that all players are "rational" in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947). We pointed out that the first analysis of common knowledge by David Lewis in "Convention : A Philosophical Analysis" (1969) does not use it and has certain significance from the viewpoint of bounded rationality.